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The Treaty on Terminal Operator Liability in
International Trade*
PAUL B. LARSEN,** JOSEPH C. SWEENEY,***
PATRICK J. FALVEY,**** and JOANNE ZAWITOSKI*****
I.
INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly received from the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) the
draft Convention on the Liability of Operators of Transport Termi-
nals in International Trade (OTT Convention).' In response, the
General Assembly resolved on December 4, 1989 to convene an
international conference of plenipotentiaries to consider the draft. 2
*Editor's Note: This is the third article that the Journal has published by these authors
dealing with the development of the Terminal Operators Convention. The earlier pieces can be
found at 20 J. Mar. L & Com. 21 (1989) (discussing the UNCITRAL Working Group studies)
and 21 J. Mar. L. & Com. 449 (1990) (examining the draft convention).
**Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation; Chair, U.S.
delegation to the 1991 U.N. Conference on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in
International Trade.
***Professor of Law, Fordham University; Vice Chair, U.S. delegation to the 1991 U.N.
Conference on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade; Chair,
U.S. delegation to the 1978 U.N. Conference on the Carriage of Goods by Sea and the 1979 CMI
Diplomatic Conference to Amend the 1924 Hague Rules.
****Special Counsel, formerly General Counsel and Deputy Executive Director, Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey; Adviser to the U.S. delegation to the 1991 U.N.
Conference on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade.
*****Partner, Semmes, Bowen and Semmes (Baltimore); Chair, Stevedoring and Terminal
Operations' Committee of the Maritime Law Association of the U.S.; Adviser to the U.S.
delegation to the 1991 U.N. Conference on the Liability of Operators of Transport Terminals in
International Trade.
120 I.L.M. 1503 (1991); Official Records, U.N. Conference on the Liability of Operators of
Transport Terminals in International Trade, A/CONF. 152/14 (U.N. Pub. Sales No. E. 93/XI/3)
(1993) [hereinafter O.R.], Final Act, at 101-09. The O.R. contains a background document on
the drafting history, the UNCITRAL draft convention, comments and proposals of govern-
ments and international organizations on the draft convention, preliminary documents of the
conference, summary records of the Plenary, Committee One (the main committee), Committee
Two (the final clauses), the Final Act and the Convention.2UNGA Res. 44/33 (1989).
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Pursuant to this resolution, such a conference was held in Vienna,
Austria, in April 1991. Following eighteen days of often stormy
meetings, the conference adopted the text of the OTT Convention on
April 19, 1991. 3
In a nutshell, the OTT Convention is designed to fill in the gaps left
by the existing liability regimes that govern the international'frans-
portation of goods. It is believed that the OTT Convention will
promote international trade by establishing a predictable, uniform
liability regime covering the time period when goods are not governed
by the existing maritime, road, rail, and air liability regimes.4
Although the terminal operator project was to have been limited to
the safekeeping of goods, 5 an examination of terminal operations
throughout the world revealed that terminal operators perform a
variety of functions in addition to straight warehousing. As a result,
by the time the OTT Convention was finalized, its scope had been
broadened considerably.
The OTT Convention takes the form of an international convention
because existing modal regimes worldwide are governed by interna-
tional conventions.6 It consists of 25 articles, including: definition of
terminal operators; scope of application; period of responsibility;
issuance of document; basis of liability; limitation of liability; special
rules on dangerous goods; rights of security in goods; notice of loss,
damage or delay of goods; limitation of actions; contractual stipula-
tions; and relationship to other transportation conventions. No
reservations may be made to the OTT Convention, which will enter
into force after ratification by five States.
The present authors had the honor of serving on the U.S. delega-
tion to the diplomatic conference. Accordingly, this article is de-
signed to acquaint readers with the task that the delegation was given
by the U.S. government, the obstacles that the delegation faced in
pursuing its agenda, and the extent to which it was able to fulfill its
assignment.
3 0.R. at 103-09, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 152/13 (1991).4An example of such a gap is the time period after goods are delivered to a warehouse
(transport terminal) by one mode of transportation, but before they are transported further by
a different mode of transportation.
5See Preliminary Draft Convention on the Liability of International Terminal Operators,
with Explanatory Report Prepared by the UNIDROIT Secretariat (Feb. 1982); UNCITRAL
Report on its 16th Session, 24 May-3 June, 1983, ACN.9/243, at 28-29; Report of the U.S.
Delegation (Larsen and Sweeney) to the 8th Session of the Working Group on International
Contract Practices, Vienna, 3-13 December, 1984 (on file with the U.S. Secretary of State).6See infra text accompanying note 24.
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II.
"SCALING THE HIMALAYAS": APPLICATION OF THE
MARITIME BILL OF LADING TO STEVEDORES
One preliminary matter must be discussed at the outset. To the surprise
of many delegations other than that of the U.S., the most complex issue
of the conference concerned the liability of stevedoring companies
under Himalaya clauses in maritime bills of lading. 7 This issue was of a
priori concern to the U.S. delegation because of the U.S. government's
policy that stevedores should have the same legal benefits as carriers.
The U.S. delegation successfully sought to maintain in the OTT
Convention the use of the liability regime provided in the Hague
Rules8 by stevedores to whom the maritime carrier has extended it
through a Himalaya clause in the bill of lading. As a result, Article 15
of the OTT Convention states that the:
Convention does not modify any rights or duties which may arise under
an international convention relating to the international carriage of
goods which is binding on a State which is a party to this Convention or
under any law of such State giving effect to a convention relating to the
international carriage of goods.
Thus, when clearly defined by the maritime bill of lading as
subcontracting agents or employees of the maritime carrier, 9 steve-
7Himalaya clauses were developed to undo the tort liability of parties in the maritime transport
of goods and people not governed by the contractual relation of shipper (or passenger) and carrier.
See Adler v. Dickson, [1955] Q.B. 158, [1954] 2 Ll. L. Rep. 122 (Q.B. 1954), appeal dismissed,
[1954] 2 LI. L. Rep. 267. The case involved a passenger on the ship Himalaya who sued in tort the
master and bosun of the ship on which she was injured rather than the contractual carrier. As a
result of the court's failure to extend the exculpatory contract provisions to the master and the
bosun, they were held liable to the injured passenger. Thereafter, elaborate exculpatory provisions
to benefit servants, agents and stevedores were added to ocean bills of lading and the Himalaya
clause doctrine was recognized by the House of Lords under an agency theory in Midland
Silicones, Ltd. v. Scruttons Ltd., [1962] App. Cas. 446, [1961] 2 Ll. L. Rep. 365. For a further
discussion, see Sweeney, New U.N. Convention on Liability of Terminal Operators in Interna-
tional Trade, 14 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1115, 1119 (1990-91).
sThe International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading
for Carriage of Goods by Sea, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, 120 L.N.T.S. 155, codified with
reservations in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (1988).
9For definitional problems, see Mikinberg v. Baltic S.S. Co., 988 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1993). A
terminal operator is a bailee under the common law, see Colgate Palmolive Co. v. S/S Dart
Canada, 724 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 963 (1984). It was the U.S.
delegation's understanding that U.S. stevedores prefer to be clearly defined as subcontractors
of maritime carriers so that they do not become subject to the diverse state laws and to the
possibility of strict and unlimited liability as in Colgate. By the same token, stevedores wish to
have the flexibility to be under the OTr Convention when they cannot have the benefits of the
Hague Rules as subcontractors (bailees) of maritime carriers.
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dores continue to have the benefit of all COGSA defenses available
to the carrier and the liability regime of the OTT Convention does
not apply.
Article 15 of the OTT Convention applies to both COGSA and the
Hague Rules. U.S. case law also holds that the rights of stevedores
may be governed by COGSA under certain circumstances.1o The
U.S. delegation clarified this point in the following statement for the
permanent record of the conference:
We voted in favor of the Convention as a whole since Article 15 states
that the Convention does not modify rights or duties which may arise
under any international carriage of goods convention or under any
national law giving effect to that convention. Since stevedores may be
entitled to certain rights of the carrier arising under the Hague Rules,
Article 15 therefore preserves the option to seek the benefits of the
carrier under the Hague Rules."I
The statement of the U.S. delegation at the conference also
clarified that the terminal operator, as defined in Article l(a) of the
OTT Convention,' 2 retains the option to seek the benefits of the
carrier under COGSA. Although briefly discussed at the working
group meetings and the plenary by the U.S. delegation, the Himalaya
clause issue had not been effectively explored before the diplomatic
conference. As a result, many delegations, unfortunately, were
unprepared to deal with its complexities until the end of the entire
process.
10 Id. See infra text accompanying notes 58-77.
11O.R. at 30, paragraph 56, slightly edited by the precis writers. See also Report of the U.S.
Delegation to the 1991 United Nations Conference on the Liability of Operators of Transport
Terminals in International Trade, Cargo Liability and the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Subcom-
mittee on Merchant Marine, Oversight Hearing on June 24, 1992, No. 102-101 at 300, 302
[hereinafter Congressional Oversight Hearing].
12Article l(a) of the OTT Convention defines a terminal operator as follows:
"Operator of a transport terminal" (hereinafter referred to as "operator") means a person
who, in the course of his business, undertakes to take in charge goods involved in
international carriage in order to perform or to procure the performance of transport-
related services with respect to the goods in an area under his control or in respect of
which he has a right of access or use. However, a person is not considered an operator
whenever he is a carrier under applicable rules of law governing carriage.
This policy-making definition creates the problem for the continued validity of the protection of
stevedores by Himalaya clauses because of the last sentence. It is the clear position of U.S.
stevedores that they are not carriers, although protected by such carrier defenses as the one
year time bar (46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6) (1988)) and the $500 per package unit limitation of
liability (46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (1988)).
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It is important to remember that the U.S. statement at the final vote
relates to the legal situation of U.S. stevedores under U.S. case law. 13
As an essential element of the OTT Convention, the statement will be
included in the submission made by the Department of State and the
President to the U.S. Congress. When the OTT Convention is
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, the statement and the
Convention will together be subject to Senate consideration. The
U.S. statement also will become an ingredient of any implementing
legislation that both Houses of Congress may adopt. In this way, the
U.S. understanding will be in U.S. legislation and will be applied by
U.S. courts. Finally, the statement will be made known to the
depositary at the time of ratification.
III.
BACKGROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) studied the issue of the
liability of terminal operators and prepared a draft convention. The
U.S. did not participate in this project.1 4
The work on a uniform liability regime for terminal operators was
transferred from UNIDROIT to UNCITRAL in 1984 when UNCI-
TRAL decided to assign the project to the UNCITRAL Working
Group on International Contract Practices.15 Because the U.S. takes
part in all of UNCITRAL's work, the Departments of State and
Transportation were of the view that the U.S. should participate in
UNCITRAL's work on the liability of transport terminal operators.
Both departments were particularly eager to ensure that U.S. inter-
ests were fully considered, regardless of the subsequent attitude of
these interests in the eventual outcome, since U.S. export and import
goods would be governed by the OTT Convention in any part of the
13 For a discussion of U.S. case law see infra note 58. Article 15 of the 011T Convention
provides:
The Convention does not modify any rights or duties which may arise under an
international convention relating to the international carriage of goods which is binding on
a State which is a party to this Convention or under any law of such State giving effect to
a convention relating to the international carriage of goods.
For a further discussion of Article 15 see infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
14See supra note 5 and Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, The Uniform Rules on the Liability of
Operators of Transport Terminals, 20 J. Mar. L. & Com. 21, 23 (1989).
15A/CN.9/243, supra note 5, at 27-28.
July 1994
344 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce Vol. 25, No. 3
world that adopted it.16 The UNCITRAL negotiations thus could be
the means of creating a legal instrument that would be acceptable for
U.S. ratification or accession and that might eventually be considered
for domestic application if a favorable consensus developed.
UNCITRAL decided to consider not only the UNIDROIT draft
convention but also to study other related issues.' 7 This was not
terribly surprising, given UNCITRAL's considerable competence
and experience in the area of uniform law for transportation and
international trade. As is well known, UNCITRAL prepared the 1978
U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg
Rules),1 8 drafted the 1980 Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG), 19 and has worked on issues affecting
international bills of exchange, promissory notes, international
checks and the electronic transfer of funds. All of this experience, as
well as much on-site observation and study of transport terminals in
many different countries, 20 was taken into consideration and became
part of the draft that was submitted by UNCITRAL to the U.N.
General Assembly in 1989.
The UNCITRAL Working Group, assigned to work on the liability
of terminal operators, began its meetings in 1984.21 A number of
fundamental policy and technical issues were raised in the Working
Group by the U.S. These issues originated from a special Study
16The OTT" Convention's scope of application, see infra text accompanying notes 80-84, is
stated in Article 2 as follows:
This Convention applies to transport-related services performed in relation to goods which
are involved in international carriage:
(1) (a) When the transport-related services are performed by an operator whose place of
business is located in a State Party, or b) When the transport-related services are
performed in a State Party, or c) When, according to the rules of private international law,
the transport-related services are governed by the law of a State Party.
(2) If the operator has more than one place of business, the place of business is that which
has the closest relationship to the transport-related services as a whole.
(3) If the operator does not have a place of business, reference is to be made to the
operator's habitual place of residence.
17See supra note 5.
18U.N. Doc. A/CONF.89/13 (1978).
19U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981). For an analysis of the CISG see J. Honnold, Uniform
Law for International Sales Under the 1980 United Nations Convention (2d ed. 1991).
2
°The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was unusually generous in educating
delegates and secretariat personnel by providing tours of the Port Authority's facilities and
generally aiding the terminal operator discussions of the U.N. delegates and UNCITRAL staff
during working group meetings in New York.21See Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 5, and Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra
note 14, at 22-24.
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Group formed under the auspices of the U.S. Secretary of State's
Advisory Committee on Private International Law. 22
The members of the Study Group were drawn largely from the
private sector. This group was a primary source of information and
policy guidance. On the Study Group were practicing lawyers as well
as representatives of shippers, carriers and insurers. The General
Counsel for the Institute of International Container Lessors (IICL),
who participated in the UNCITRAL meetings as an observer, was a
member of the Study Group. Other active participants included the
General Counsel of the National Association of Stevedores (NAS) as
well as an insurance expert representing the American Institute of
Marine Underwriters (AIMU).
In order to form positions for the U.S. delegation, the Study Group
considered many questions, 23 including the following:
1. Should the new liability regime for terminal operators be in the
form of a model law or a treaty?
Members of the Study Group, in particular the insurance expert,
tended to believe that the terminal operator project should be in the
form of a treaty because model legislation could not fit into the
existing international transportation context in which liability is
governed by treaties. 24 Treaty law also would have the advantage of
predictability. A uniformly applicable, limited liability regime would
aid insurers in ascertaining the overall risk of loss of goods in the
charge of terminal operators. The Department of State, the Depart-
ment of Transportation and the U.S. delegation consequently favored
the treaty law approach and the terminal operators' liability regime is
in the form of a treaty.
221Id. at 22, 52-54.
23Id.241d. at 52. Examples of such transportation treaties are: the Hague Rules, supra note 8; the
Hamburg Rules, supra note 18; the International Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Rail
(COTIF), Berne, May 9, 1980, Cmnd. 8535; and the Convention on the Contract for the
International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), May 19, 1956, 399 U.N.T.S. 189. See also
Driscoll & Larsen, The Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, 57 Tul. L.
Rev. 193 (1982) (discussing the 1980 U.N. Convention on International Multimodal Transport
of Goods [hereinafter Multimodal Convention]), and Larsen, 1989 Inter-American Convention
on International Carriage of Goods by Road, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 121 (1991) (discussing the
Organization of American States' 1989 Road Convention).
July 1994
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2. Should terminal operators on an individual basis have the option
of removing themselves from the OTT Convention in the way that
parties to an international sale of goods may choose some law
other than the CISG?
The result of individual opting out would have been total unpre-
dictability of the applicable legal regime and lack of uniformity. 25
Insurers would experience difficulty in fixing the overall risk of loss
while goods were in the charge of terminal operators. Insurance to
cover the uncertainty of the risk would be an additional cost factor.
Consequently, the Study Group 26 and, in turn, the U.S. delegation,
did not favor opting out by individual businesses.
3. Should stevedores be included or excluded from the application
of the OTT Convention?
In view of the fact that most transport terminal operations involve
the use of stevedores, this proved to be a fundamental issue. The
issue also was important to the U.S. because of the magnitude of
activity and special legal status of stevedores in U.S. law and the
importance of the industry in the eyes of the Department of Trans-
portation.27
The special legal status of U.S. stevedores is derived from U.S.
case law,28 which provides that stevedores have the benefit of the
defenses available to carriers under maritime bills of lading, in
particular COGSA's $500 per package limitation of liability29 and one
year statute of limitations. 30 These benefits may be made available to
U.S. stevedores through narrowly drawn clauses in maritime bills of
lading; that is, when clearly defined in a maritime bill of lading as
subcontracting agents or employees of the carrier. In other circum-
stances, stevedores are not entitled to these benefits and are subject
to state laws; that is, the common law of bailments (or strict liability)
or common law negligence.31
25 Article 6 of the CISG provides an example of individual opting out. See Honnold, supra
note 19, § 74, at 125.
26 See Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, at 52-53.
27See infra text accompanying notes 58-77.
28Id.
2946 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (1988).
3046 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6) (1988).31See infra note 58.
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Shippers and insurers favored the inclusion of stevedores within
the OTT Convention. 32 In their view, the OTT Convention could not
serve their purposes unless it included stevedores. While stevedores
would have preferred exclusion, they also expressed a strong wish to
protect their existing COGSA benefits.33 As a result, the U.S.
delegation adopted the position that the OTT Convention should not
be applicable to "stevedores who are already covered by applicable
rules of law governing carriage." 34 This position was supported by
the NAS.35
Consequently, the U.S. comment to UNCITRAL36 stated that the
U.S. position "would assure stevedores, when they handle goods
under maritime bills of lading which extend to them the benefits
possessed by the carriers, that they are treated no less favorably
under the proposed convention than are the carriers." 37
4. What should be the form of documentation used by terminal
operators to reflect the contract with customers?
The Study Group was of the view that maximum flexibility should
be allowed the terminal operator.38 In other words, terminal opera-
tors should be free to use the documentation of their carrier custom-
ers or their own documentation. Furthermore, documentation should
not slow the movement of the transportation chain. For example, it
was noted that stevedores might not have time to weigh the goods
during loading and unloading operations and therefore should not be
obligated to record the weight of the goods.
Thus, the U.S. delegation adopted a position of maximum flexibil-
ity of documentation, possible conversion to paperless documenta-
32See Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, at 53.33See supra note 9 and infra note 34. It is not inconceivable that some carriers, for
competitive reasons, might be forced to abandon the $500 per package defense.
34A/CN.9/319, at 13; letter of Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private Interna-
tional Law, Feb. 2, 1989, transmitting comments of the U.S. on the draft convention.
35In response to the Pfund letter, see supra note 34, Thomas D. Wilcox, General Counsel of
the NAS, wrote on March 3, 1989 to U.S. delegate Paul B. Larsen: "We are most pleased with
the position that the government will take in this matter, and thank all of you on your side of
the U.S. table for listening to us on the other side of the table. We think that the position taken
by the United States to be the correct one and one which best serves the needs of the United
States interests. We hope that you are successful in getting the rest of the world to agree with
you."36A/CN.9/319, supra note 34, at 14.371d. See infra text accompanying notes 58-77.38See Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, at 53.
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tion, such as electronic data interchange (EDI), and maximum
adaptability to electronic data processing.
5. What should be the liability regime governing the relationship
between terminal operators and their customers?
The primary concern of the Study Group, 39 and later of the U.S.
delegation, was to ensure maximum uniformity of law. The shippers
expressed support for presumed liability of the terminal operator, but
some of the maritime bar opposed this solution. Presumed liability,
however, is a feature of the international air, rail and road conven-
tions already in force and is even found in Article IV(2)(q) of the
Hague Rules.
6. What should be the limitation of liability?
Shippers preferred a liability limit based on weight only, whereas
the admiralty bar favored a per package limit on liability for goods
involved in maritime carriage. Liability limits in the existing air, rail
and road conventions are based on weight alone and representatives
of these transport modes did not favor a per package limit.
7. Should the right to limit liability be lost in cases of intentional
torts by the terminal operator's servants and agents?
Shippers and the admiralty bar differed on the issue of whether
terminal operators should be exposed to the risk of forfeiting their
limited liability when their servants and agents commit intentional
torts. Although shippers favored such a rule, some of the admiralty
bar opposed it despite the fact that such a provision is built into the
Visby Amendments to the Hague Rules favored by these same
members of the admiralty bar. The difference was resolved as
follows: because most terminal operators are corporations acting only
through their servants and agents, it was thought necessary and
prudent to attribute the acts of servants and agents to their employing
corporations. On the other hand, the U.S. delegation adopted and
expressed the view that intentional torts by independent contractors
hired by terminal operators should not expose terminal operators to
a loss of limited liabilityA0
391d. at 52-53.
4°Id. See A/CN.9/319, supra note 34, at 16.
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8. To what extent should terminal operators have the right to
recover damages due to mislabeled dangerous goods?
The terminal operator usually is able to identify the party with whom
the operator contracts for services. Thus, the operator can recover
under this contract for the adverse consequences of improperly labeled
goods handled by the operator. However, mislabeling of goods is often
done deliberately or accidentally at a stage in the chain of transportation
that precedes the transport stage. The Chemical Manufacturers Associ-
ation (CMA) was consulted and agreed that the usual rule should apply
to damages caused by mislabeling by, for example, the manufacturer of
dangerous goods prior to the contract with the terminal operator; that is,
that the terminal operator should be able to recover from whichever
person fails to observe applicable laws or regulations on labeling of
goods and thus fails to inform the terminal operator of the dangerous
nature of the goods. 41 Thus, compensation should be obtainable not only
from contracting parties but also from persons in the chain of transpor-
tation preceding the contract with the terminal operator.
The Study Group agreed to accept the recommendation of the
CMA, 42 and this became the position of the U.S. delegation.
9. May the terminal operator sell the goods to satisfy charges for
services?
A maritime carrier representative called attention to the point that
not only should the terminal operator be able to sell goods to satisfy
charges for services, it is sometimes inconvenienced by unclaimed
goods that occupy space needed for other purposes. 43 Consequently,
the U.S. delegation proposed that a terminal operator should be able
to consider goods in its charge abandoned if not claimed within a fixed
period of time. 44
In relation to the terminal operator's right to sell goods to satisfy
charges, the IICL strongly urged that terminal operators should not
be able to satisfy unpaid charges by selling the containers in which
such goods are stored when the containers are leased and clearly
marked as regards ownership. 45 The U.S. delegation strongly ad-
vanced this view.
41See Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, at 53.
421d. See A/CONF.152/C. I/SR. 12 at 4.
43Letter from Peter M. Klein, General Counsel, Sea-Land Corporation, Nov. I, 1988.
44Id. See A/CN.9/319, supra note 34, at 16.45Letter from Edward A. Woolley, IICL Secretary, Nov. 28, 1988.
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10. How much notice should be given to the terminal operator of
loss, damage to, or delay of the goods?
A maritime carrier representative expressed the view that where
loss or damage is not apparent, the consignee may not discover any
loss or damage until a considerable time after taking delivery. 6 The
carrier suggested 90 days' notice and this became the U.S. position.
The Study Group served as an excellent sounding board for ideas
as well as a source of practical information about the practices of
terminal operators. Members of the group generously made them-
selves available for group meetings and for individual consultations.
Another source of contributions to the U.S. delegation's work was
the public response to two law review articles on the UNCITRAL
project, authored by the members of the U.S. delegation to the
meetings of the Working Groups in Vienna and New York. 47 These
articles were read widely in the U.S. and abroad and became, in
effect, working documents for the UNCITRAL conferences. They
were taken into consideration and cited by other delegations during
the negotiations. In fact, scholarly publications proved an excellent
vehicle for explaining the need for the OTT Convention.
IV.
THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
A. Introduction
A total of 48 States were represented at the diplomatic conference
in Vienna.48 Attendance was less than hoped for in that governments
from South America, Africa and Asia refrained from travel because of
the Gulf War that had been raging in January and February 1991,
immediately preceding the conference. Cancellation of the confer-
ence was considered for that reason; but the schedule of U.N.
46Klein letter, supra note 43.47See Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, and Larsen, Sweeney, Falvey & Davies,
The 1991 Diplomatic Conference on Uniform Liability Rules for Operators of Transport
Terminals, 21 J. Mar. L. & Com. 449 (1990).
For an overview of the plenary and the diplomatic conference from the viewpoint of a
Spanish delegate, see Moran, Notas para la Historia del Convenio sobre la responsabilidad de
los E.T.T., IX Annuario de Derecho Maritimo 89 (1991), and Moran, La unificacion de
responsabilidad de los empresarios de terminales de transporte (E. T. T.): una presentacion, 207
Revista de Derecho Mercantil 207 (1993).
48O.R. at 23, A/CONF. 152/13. At the time of the diplomatic conference the recent changes
in the structure of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia had not yet occurred.
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conferences was fully booked so that the OTT conference could not
have been rescheduled for either 1992 or 1993, and much of the
impetus for the conference might have dissipated if it had not been
held as scheduled by the U.N. General Assembly. Thus, UNCITRAL
decided to hold the conference as planned despite the possibility of
reduced attendance.
Nineteen specialized agencies, including U.N. and other govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations, were represented by
observers at the conference. 49 The U.S. delegation was small but the
private sector was well represented.
Most of the work of the conference was done in the First Committee,
in which all delegations participated. It was chaired by Judge Jean-Paul
Beraudo of France, who had participated in the UNCITRAL working
group meetings. The final clauses and other non-substantive work were
done in the Second Committee, in which all delegations also partici-
pated. It was chaired by Professor Jelena Vilus of Yugoslavia5o
The conference elected as chair Professor Jose Maria Abascal of
Mexico, who also had attended the UNCITRAL sessions that had
prepared the draft convention. Professor Eric E. Bergsten, Chief of
the International Trade Law Branch of the U.N. Office of Legal
Affairs (head of the UNCITRAL secretariat), acted efficiently as
executive secretary of the diplomatic conference. He was ably
assisted by Stephen R. Katz of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs.
B. International Context of the Negotiations
The absence of the U.S. from the original UNIDROIT delibera-
tions on the liabilities of terminal operators already had caused the
entire project to have a European flavor, and because of
UNIDROIT's concern with the safekeeping aspect of terminal oper-
ators the transportation outlook sometimes had been sacrificed to the
hotelkeeper viewpoint, although UNIDROIT also had prepared a
number of transport-related conventions. Because of geographical
location and the multitude of conflicting national and international
liability regimes in Europe, the Europeans had particular reason to
focus on the liability of terminal operators.
From the point of view of international transportation, the terminal
operator's relationship with its customers is more domestic and less
international in nature than are the air, maritime, rail and road
4 91d.
5
°A/CONF. 152/13.
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transportation relationships. That is the reason why unification of this
transportation area came subsequent in time to the unification of the
law of the transportation modes.5' That is also the reason why the
terminal operators' legal regime has a more concentrated impact on
domestic law than on international law.
C. National Participation
The policy and legal interests of individual countries participating
in the conference merit some description5 2
Italy had a unique role in that the project originated in UNIDROIT,
located in Rome. UNIDROIT and its work receive positive support
from the government of Italy. Italy also shaped the terminal operator
project more than any other State because the head of the working group
that drafted the OTT Convention was the well-known Professor Joachim
Bonell of the University of Rome, an expert in international trade who
proved to be an unusually capable and energetic chairman. As chair as
well as the Italian delegate, Professor Bonell worked for an effective
unification of the liability of the terminal operators.
France also played a significant part in shaping the OTT Conven-
tion, not only through active participation in the working group but
also by having its delegate, Judge Jean-Paul Beraudo, play the key
role of chairing the First Committee, the main working committee of
the diplomatic conference.
Germany participated very actively in the working group and in the
diplomatic conference. Germany had a special interest in defining
stevedores' liability because, under the law of Germany, stevedores
may totally exculpate themselves from liability in contracts with
maritime carriers (such total exculpation, of course, is not permitted
in the U.S.). Thus, Germany favored bringing its stevedores within
the OTT Convention to regulate their liability. 53
Spain's active interest in the project was different from that of other
members of the European Community. Unlike the views of the U.K.
and the Netherlands, Spain anticipated positive results; unlike Ger-
many, there was no concern with the position of stevedores; and unlike
France, complex conflict of laws positions were not propounded.
51See supra note 24.52 Compare the discussion of U.S. policy formation in the private sector, supra notes 23-47
and accompanying text.5 30.R. at 34, A/CONF.152/7 at 5; O.R. at 132-33, A/CONF.152/C.1/SR.1 at 2. Germany
co-sponsored A/CONF.152/L.5, a four nation proposal to amend Article l(a). See infra notes
65-66 and accompanying text.
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Mexico actively supported the OTT Convention. The Mexican
delegate served as chair of the diplomatic conference and had an
important role in shaping the product of the conference. Mexico also
had particular problems during the transfer of goods from the carrier
to the terminal, known as el periodo de nadie.54 This is a time when
the goods have been unloaded but the terminal operator has failed to
take charge of them, so that no one is responsible for them under
Mexican law.
Australia, like Germany, had a special interest in insuring that its
stevedores' liability would be governed by the OTT Convention
because Australian stevedores may totally exculpate themselves from
liability in contracts with maritime carriers and bills of lading. Thus,
Australia was persistent in its efforts to bring stevedores under the
OTT Convention. 55
Japan, like Germany and Australia, sought to define its stevedores'
liability as being governed by the OTT Convention because Japanese
stevedores may totally exculpate themselves from liability.5 6
The U.K. had participated only sporadically in the working group;
further, when the U.K. did attend, the representation differed each
time. The U.K. delegation already had announced at the beginning of
the conference that the U.K. was unlikely to adopt the OTT Conven-
tion; it was among the six countries that abstained on the final vote on
the OTT Convention. The U.K. delegation stated that, in its view, the
OTT Convention would have unfavorable insurance consequences,
although it did not appreciate the dangers to insurance interests of a
multitude of different liability regimes, some imposing strict liability
with or without limitation while others employed various types of
negligence with or without limitation.5 7
V.
PROVISIONS OF THE OTT CONVENTION
Having traced the background and proceedings of the conference,
it is now appropriate to examine each of the 25 articles of the OTT
Convention.
'40.R. at 150, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.4 at 7.55Australia co-sponsored A/CONF.152/L.5, O.R. at 99, the four nation proposal to amend
Article l(a). See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
56Japan joined Germany and Australia, see supra notes 53 and 55, in co-sponsoring
AICONF.152/L.5, the four nation proposal to amend Article l(a).57See Colgate, supra note 9. Note that Colgate resulted in unlimited and strict liability, as
described infra in the discussion of Article 1, which would affect insurance policies originating
or being reinsured in the London insurance market.
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1. Definitions
a. Terminal Operator
Formulation of the definition of terminal operator changed many
times during the three weeks of the conference until the present
definition was selected on the next to last day. It was the most
controversial aspect of the negotiations. The present text of Article
l(a) of the OTT Convention reads as follows:
"Operator of a transport terminal" (hereinafter referred to as "opera-
tor") means a person who, in the course of its business, undertakes to
take in charge goods involved in international carriage in order to
perform or to procure the performance of transport-related services
with respect to the goods in an area under its control or in respect of
which he has a right of access or use. However, a person is not
considered an operator whenever he is a carrier under applicable rules
of law governing carriage. [emphasis added]
Opposition of the U.S. delegation to the total divorce of carriers
and terminal operators had been consistent throughout the seven year
development of the project because of U.S. efforts to preserve the bill
of lading option for U.S. stevedores.5 8 The 1988 UNCITRAL Work-
ing Group text had provided that:
58In response to the specially expressed wishes of the NAS, see supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text, the U.S. delegation had as one of its major goals maintaining in the OTT
Convention the uniformity of liability law which U.S. stevedores have achieved under the
Hague Rules' maritime bill of lading; that is, when clearly defined as subcontractors (bailees) of
a maritime carrier, stevedores have the benefit of the same defenses available to the carrier.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in dictum, invited the use of bill of lading clauses to protect those
agents who carry out the functions of carriers in Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawi.ll Machinery Corp.,
359 U.S. 297 (1959). Following Herd, a number of courts have held that narrowly drawn clauses,
clearly expressed in bills of lading, will extend the Hague Rules' benefits, such as the $500 per
package unit limit of liability, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1304(5) (1988), and the one year statute of
limitations, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(6) (1988), to stevedores. See, e.g., Secrest Machine Corp. v. S.S.
Tiber, 450 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1971); Bernard Screen Printing Corp. v. Meyer Line, 464 F.2d 934 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1973); Brown & Root, Inc. v. MiV Peisander, 648 F.2d 415
(5th Cir. 1981); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Barber Blue Sea Line, 675 F.2d 266 (1 th Cir.
1982); B. Elliott (Canada) Ltd. v. John T. Clark & Son of Maryland, Inc., 704 F.2d 1305 (4th Cir.
1983); Koppers Co., Inc. v. S/S Defiance, 704 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1983); Seguros Illimani S.A. v.
MN Popi P, 929 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1991); Taisho Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Maersk Line, Inc., 796
F. Supp. 336 (N.D. Ill. 1992), afF'd, 7 F.3d 238 (7th Cir. 1993).
It should be noted, however, that there are a substantial number of cases rejecting the carrier
defenses for stevedores because of insufficient specificity in identifying the protected parties or
the protections being extended. See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. S.S. Mormacscan, 441 F.2d 476 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 855 (1971); Rupp v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 479 F.2d 674 (2d
Cir. 1973); De Laval Turbine, Inc. v. West India Indus. Inc., 502 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1974); La
Salle Machine Tool, Inc. v. Maher Terminals, Inc., 611 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1979); Mikinberg v.
Baltic Steamship Co., 988 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1993).
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A person shall not be considered an operator.., to the extent that he
is responsible for the goods as a carrier or multimodal transport
operator under applicable rules of law governing carriage. [emphasis
added]
Following strenuous efforts of the U.S. delegation at the UNCITRAL
plenary in June 1989, the words "as a carrier" were deleted. In the
first discussion at the diplomatic conference, Germany sought an oral
amendment to restore the 1988 text, opposed by the U.S. delegation,
at which point Italy sought to change the language while preserving
the concept that the terminal operator could not act in any capacity as
a carrier.5 9 Because of uncertainty about the issues in the discussion,
an informal drafting group was formed to attempt to resolve the
problem by the use of definitions. 60 The effort to define "carrier" for
the OTT Convention proved futile, however, due to the fact that each
of the modal conventions has its own definition of carrier.
After several hours of discussion, the informal group could only
agree that "a carrier means a person being a carrier under provisions
of law." Subsequently this was changed to ". . . a person being a
carrier by virtue of an international convention or paramount national
law covering carriage of goods." But the definition was again changed
to ". . . a person being a carrier by virtue of an international
convention or relevant national law covering carriage of goods." 6 1
Eventually, all attempts to define "carrier" were rejected. 62
In the meanwhile, Japan sought to reintroduce the 1988 OTT
definition concept in language similar to that already rejected in 1989:
"However, a person shall not be considered an operator whenever he
is responsible as a carrier or multimodal transport operator for the
goods under applicable rules of law governing carriage." 63 This effort
was defeated with eight States in favor, eight opposed, and twelve
abstentions. The 1989 text then was reinstated with twelve votes in
favor, eight opposed, and eight abstentions. Although this definition
was sustained against further attack in the drafting committee, during
preparation of the Report of the First Committee Australia introduced
another definition of carrier: 64
590.R. at 135, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.1 at 2.
6°A/CONF.152/C. 1/L.44/Rev. 1.6 d.620.R. at 207-08, A/CONF. 152/C. I/SR. 16 at 3.
63ACONF. 152/C. I/L. 19.
64A/CONF.152/C.I/L.56, Rev. 1.
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Carrier means a person who is a carrier by virtue of an international
convention on the carriage of goods or national law implementing or
[based on] [derived from] and corresponding with such a convention, but
not a non-carrying intermediary unless he shares all the relevant rights and
liabilities of a carrier under such a convention or national law.
These issues all resurfaced at the conference's plenary review of the
texts on April 16, 1991. Australia, Germany, Italy and Japan combined
their efforts to draw a hard and fast distinction between "terminal
operators," including stevedores, and "carriers," excluding steve-
dores. 65 According to their representatives, in their countries Himalaya
clauses exculpated stevedores totally from any liability for damages to
cargo. In response, the U.S. delegation again explained that although
U.S. stevedores may use carrier defenses, total exculpation of steve-
dores by Himalaya clauses is not possible under U.S. law.66 The chair,
noting the inapplicability of the Himalaya clause to civil law systems,
urged the need for a new version of the definition of operator. 67
The U.S.S.R. proposed a compromise that would have solved the
problem. Under its suggestion, a definition of "stevedore" would
have been included that would have distinguished U.S. stevedores
(protected by some carrier defenses) from totally exculpated steve-
dores. Unfortunately, this solution was not acceptable to Australia,
Germany, Italy and Japan. 68
In the end, it was decided to reject the text already approved in the
First Committee (and taken from the 1989 draft) on the basis that the
only way to prevent total exculpation of stevedores by Himalaya
clauses would be by a total exclusion of carriers and their defenses
from the definition of terminal operator. Thus, the new text, now
found in Article 1(a), was approved with twenty-six votes in favor,
four opposed (including the U.S.) and five abstentions.69
6 5See the four nation proposal discussed supra notes 53 and 55.
66See Zawitoski, Limitation of Liability for Stevedores and Terminal Operators Under the
Carrier's Bill of Lading and COGSA, 16 J. Mar. L. & Com. 337 (1985), and Zawitoski, Federal,
State, and International Regulation of Marine Terminal Operators in the United States, 64 Tul.
L. Rev. 439 (1989). At this point it should be noted that while the U.S. delegation contained an
expert on stevedore liability problems, there was no such expertise on the delegations of
Australia, Germany, Italy and Japan, nor was it likely that stevedore interests in those countries
had even been consulted prior to the efforts of their delegations to eliminate stevedore
protections established by clauses in bills of lading.
67Unfortunately, the chair's remarks were not correct as the Himalaya clause provides total
exculpation of stevedores in Australia, Germany, Italy and Japan, according to their delegates.
Only Australia does not follow the traditions of the civil law.
68O.R. at 205, A.CONF.152/C.1/SR.15 at 7-8.
69 0.R. at 121, A.CONF.152/SR.6 at 7.
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In view of this last minute decision of the plenary, the U.S. delegation
next sought to deal with the terminal operator definition exclusion of
carriers by adding a reservation to the OTI Convention. The Second
Committee already had agreed, however, in Article 21 that there would
be no reservations. The U.S. proposed reservation stated:
At the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to this convention, a state
may declare that it will not apply the convention to non-carrying
intermediaries whose rights and liabilities are determined by applicable
rules of law governing carriage provided only that such non-carrying
intermediaries do not thereby exclude all liability. 70
The U.S. proposed reservation did not attain the two-thirds majority
necessary at this final stage, the vote being twelve in favor, eleven against
and twelve abstentions. 71 Accordingly, the next U.S. effort on this
problem was a proposal to delete Article 21 entirely, but this also failed. 72
This, however, was not to be the end of the battle. At the final vote on
the text of the OTT Convention the U.S. delegation renewed its fight and
ultimately obtained the flexibility desired by U.S. stevedores. 73 This can
be seen by looking at the OTT Convention's Preamble and Article 15.
The Preamble states that the OTl Convention is intended to establish
.. uniform rules concerning liability for loss of, damage to or delay in
handing over such goods while they are in the charge of operators of
transport terminals and are not covered by the laws of carriage arising
out of conventions applicable to the various modes of transport." This
sentence was proposed by the U.S. delegation 74 precisely to clarify that
the OTT Convention does not apply when terminal operators and
stevedores are "covered by the laws of carriage" such as the Hague
Rules. Thus, the OTT Convention is not intended to apply when a
stevedore is covered by the maritime bill of lading as a subcontractor or
bailee of the carrier.
The U.S. delegation also introduced a statement into the perma-
nent records of the conference explaining its final vote. 75 The
7 0O.R. at 100, A.CONF.152/L.7; O.R. at 124-25, A/CONF.152.SR.7 at 5.7 11d.721d. The U.S. delegation's argument was based on the fact that the Hague Rules, supra note
8, as well as some other maritime conventions have no provisions concerning reservations.73 0.R. at 101, A/CONF.152/13 at 5.740.R. at 130, A/CONF.152/SR.8 at 3.
75Id. If the OTr Convention is adopted by the U.S. then this statement will become
legislative history and will be submitted with the U.S. ratification to the U.N. (the depositary
of the OTT Convention) as the U.S, understanding of the OTT Convention. Only U.S. courts,
of course, will be affected by the implementing legislation. The courts will have access to and
will act consistently with the legislative history and the U.S. understanding.
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explanation makes it clear that: 1) the OTT Convention does not
modify any rights or duties that may arise under the Hague Rules or
an international carriage of goods convention or any national law
(including COGSA) giving effect to such a convention; and, 2) Article
15 preserves the stevedore's option to seek the benefits that the
carrier enjoys under the Hague Rules.
The NAS had expressed the fear that U.S. stevedores would lose
the flexibility to use either the maritime bill of lading or the OTT
Convention because Article l(a) of the OTT Convention defines
terminal operator as one who takes charge of goods involved in
international carriage, but such operator does not come under the
convention ". . . whenever he is a carrier under applicable rules of
law governing carriage." The text of Article 15, however, assures
stevedores that the benefits that they enjoy under the Hague Rules
will continue to exist after adoption of the OTT Convention, since the
"Convention does not modify any rights or duties which may arise
under an international convention relating to the international car-
riage of goods [Hague Rules] which is binding on a State which is a
party to this Convention or under any law of such State [COGSA]
giving effect to a convention relating to the international carriage of
goods." 76 Thus, the U.S. statement at the conference ensures that the
definition of operator in Article l(a) is governed by the substantive
provisions of Article 15. 77
76 See the text of Article 15 supra note 13. The Australian delegation was the moving force
behind the four nation proposal that "a person is not considered an operator whenever he is a
carrier under applicable rules of law governing carriage." This proposal to amend the Article
l(a) definition of operator was adopted over the strong objection of the U.S. delegation.
However, the Australian delegate made the following statement:
In reply to the point made by the United States representative that the Australian
provision for non-carrying intermediaries would prejudice the application of the "Hima-
laya clause" in common law jurisdictions, he said that it was certainly not his delegation's
intent to interfere with the judicial decisions taken in any other State's jurisdiction. Such
decisions would be within the realm of national law, whereas the Conference was seeking
to develop uniform rules, and the question at issue was to what extent national law was
relevant for that purpose. In fact because of the way article I and 15 were drafted at
present, national laws could still have an impact on how the Convention was interpreted
in specific jurisdictions. It was that point which had been of concern to his delegation.
O.R. at 205-06, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR 15 at 9.77For a French report on this aspect of the OTT Convention see Marguet, Operateurs de
Terminaux: Analyse du Dernier Texte de la CNUCED sur leur Responsabilitg, 512 Droit
Maritime Franqais 71 (Jan. 1992) ("En revanche, il est specifi qu'elle [la convention] ne
s'appliquera pas si une autre convention internationale applicable contient des dispositions
traitant du meme object. On pense naturellement aux dispositions de la Convention de
Bruxelles de 1924.").
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Lastly, the alternative availability of the OTT Convention is
important to cover the possibility that the existing legal structure for
U.S. stevedores might be eliminated in the future through an act of
Congress, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling adverse to the Himalaya
clause or the decision of carriers to increase or even eliminate the
package limitation of liability in an intensely competitive market.
Should that occur while the OTT Convention is not in force in the
U.S., stevedores, carriers, shippers and insurers would be exposed to
the vagaries, uncertainties and likely greater liability exposure of
state and territorial laws for claims arising at transport terminals. 78
b. Goods
The term "goods" in Article l(b) is broad and includes not only
goods but also the container, pallet or similar articles of transport
used to load and ship the goods. On the other hand, there is no
purpose in applying the OTT Convention when empty containers,
pallets or similar articles of transport are not in a transport terminal
but are in a storage yard for empty containers. The U.S. delegation
maintained this view throughout the negotiations. While the U.S.
proposal to make this exclusion specific in words was not accepted at
the conference, the current text remains unchanged from the draft
convention. It may be interpreted, however, to exclude containers in
a storage yard for empty containers and the U.S. delegation stated its
understanding to this effect at the end of the discussion on this issue
at the conference. 79
2. Scope of Application
The OTT Convention applies to "transport-related services" pro-
vided to goods in "international carriage." These two terms are
defined in the OTT Convention.
The term "transport-related services" is defined by example in
Article l(b). It includes storage, warehousing, loading, unloading,
78 0f course, filing a tariff with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is a possible course
of action for stevedores seeking to limit their liability. Such tariffs, however, are subject to
protests that they are unreasonable or discriminatory. If a protest is filed, the FMC can
investigate, hold hearings and ultimately reject or modify the tariff. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 816
(1988).
79A/CN.9/319 at 14, O.R. at 137, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR 2 at 5. On this point see also the
discussion of Article 10 infra, note 157 and accompanying text (O.R. at 191-92, A/CONF. 152/
C.I/SR.13 at 2-3).
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stowage, trimming, dunnaging and lashing. This long list of examples
was adopted when it became apparent that terminal operators per-
form not only warehousing but many other functions. Attempts were
made to narrow the scope of the OTT Convention by limiting the
definition of "transport-related services" to the stated examples. 80
The conference rejected these attempts, however, and left the
definition of "transport-related services" flexible and open to future
kinds of services; it was clearly understood, however, that "trans-
port-related services" do not include financial services.81
The term "international carriage" is defined in Article 1(c) as "any
carriage in which the place of departure and the place of destination
are identified as being in two different States when the goods are
taken in charge by the operator." An objective standard is intended
in Article 1(c), as is obvious by the use of the word "identified" to
determine whether or not the origin and destination of the goods are
in two different countries. Unsuccessful attempts were made at the
conference to narrow the scope of the OTT Convention by using a
more subjective standard (i.e., that the terminal operator knew that
the goods were in international carriage). A proposal was made to
insert the words "according to the contract of carriage" after the
words "in which." This proposal was not adopted because the
document (the contract of carriage) might not be available to the
terminal operator.8 2
As can be seen, draft Article 2 of the OTT Convention was not
changed by the conference. 83 The OTT Convention applies to trans-
port-related services provided to goods in international carriage
when: (a) the services are performed by a terminal operator who has
a place of business in a State that is a party to the OTT Convention;
(b) the services of the terminal operator are performed in such a
jurisdiction; or, (c) private international law provides that the serv-
ices are subject to the law of a State Party. The law applicable in the
place of business that has the closest relationship to the transport-
related services applies when the terminal operator has more than one
place of business. The law of the place of the terminal operator's
habitual residence governs if the operator does not have a place of
business.84
8°A/CONF. 152/C. 1/L.23.
815ee statement of U.S. delegation, O.R. at 142, AICONF.152/C.I/SR.3 at 2.
82 Proposal by the Netherlands delegation, A/CONF. 152/C. 1/1.23.83See supra note 16.
840.R. A/CONF.152/13 at 6.
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3. Period of Responsibility
The terminal operator's period of responsibility is from the time the
operator takes charge of the goods until the time the goods have been
handed over or placed at the disposal of the person entitled to
delivery. Initially, it should be recalled that if a stevedore is in charge
of goods pursuant to Article 3 and therefore is responsible for them,
the liability will vary depending on whether there is an effective
Himalaya clause or the stevedore's liability is governed by the OTT
Convention. 85
The concept that the terminal operator is responsible for the goods
"from the time he has taken them in charge until the time he has
handed them over or placed them at the disposal of the person
entitled to take delivery" caused considerable discussion. A number
of States sought extreme precision as to the exact moment when the
goods would be in someone's "charge." Some even suggested that
the goods must be put behind a fence or taken into a shed by the
terminal operator. No perfect formula, other than "taken in charge,"
could be found to fit the various circumstances, including the situa-
tions under the sea, air, rail and road modes between the time when
one carrier ceases to be responsible and another carrier takes over.
The concept of "charge" was familiar to civil law lawyers from its
usage in Article 1384 of the French Civil Code's "sous la garde de." 86
U.S. lawyers also were familiar with the concept from the Harter
Act's period of responsibility.87 Article 4 of the Hamburg Rules
makes the carrier responsible while in charge of the goods. 88 Article
4(2), however, details a range of limitations on the period of respon-
sibility. Such limitations are not found in Article 3 of the OTT
Convention. Several delegations to the conference sought to limit
further the period of the terminal operator's responsibility. The
prevailing view was that the context of the OTT Convention89
provides sufficient delimitation of the terminal operator's period of
responsibility. Many delegations continued to be dissatisfied but no
better solution could be found.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 58-77.
86See also Law No. 66-420 of June 18, 1966, as amended by Law No. 79-1103 of Dec. 21,
1979 and Law No. 86-1292 of Dec. 23, 1986.
87See 46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (1988).
88The concept of "in charge" derives, in part, from the Hater Act case law. See, e.g., Baker
Oil Tools, Inc. v. Delta Steamship Lines, Inc., 562 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1977).
89See, e.g., Articles 1, 2, 4 and 10.
OTT Convention 361July 1994
362 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
The terminal operator thus has the flexibility to end the period of
responsibility by either handing the goods over or placing them at the
disposal of the person entitled to delivery. This provides a way for the
operator to terminate the period of responsibility when the consignee
cannot be located.
The conference rejected the U.K. delegation's proposal that the
terminal operator be in "sole" charge of the goods in order to be
responsible for them. In view of the nature of the operator's func-
tions, such a requirement could only lead to disputes because of the
many "transport-related" functions being performed during the gaps
between modes or prior to destination; hence, goods may not be in
the operator's sole charge. Some of the "transport-related services"
listed in Article 1 (d)-such as loading, unloading or lashing-may use
other contractors even while the terminal operator is in "sole" charge
of the goods. 9o The proposal seemed to be an invitation to divide up
the present activities of operators into small specialties of individual,
uninsured and asset-free corporations, just as fleets have been broken
up into single ship-owning corporations.
4. Documents and Electronic Data Processing
a. Issuance of Document
Under Article 4, the terminal operator has the flexibility to use the
customer's document, which may be in the form of a maritime bill of
lading or other receipt used by the carrier. Alternatively, the terminal
operator may issue an operator's bill or may issue no document at all.
The customer usually gets to decide which form of document, if any,
will be used.
If the terminal operator elects to use the document presented by the
customer, the operator ' will rubberstamp the customer's document,
record the date and sign it. The customer's document will identify the
goods and will likely contain all of the information which is custom-
arily recorded in a bill of lading (such as identity, weight, quantity,
condition, consignor and consignee). At a minimum, the customer
will present a simple receipt identifying the goods which the terminal
operator will date and sign. This method relieves the operator (who
often is a stevedore) of the burden of stopping the flow of goods to
check and record information relating to the goods. This system suits
the stevedores because they usually handle the goods for only a few
9°O.R. at 147-49, AICONF.152/C.I/SR. 4 at 2-4.
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minutes. The system is particularly suitable for stevedore transfers
from one carrier to another carrier. The U.S. delegation put a great
deal of effort into obtaining this flexibility for stevedores and their
customers.
At times, the customer may elect not to present a document. For
example, a manufacturer, rather than a carrier, may deliver goods to
the terminal and may not present a document for use by the operator.
In this situation, the operator may issue a terminal operator's
document under Article 4(l)(b), which requires a more formal docu-
ment than the document that originates from the customer. The
operator's document must acknowledge receipt of the goods, state
the date of receipt and record the condition and quantity of the goods
"as far as they can be ascertained by reasonable means of checking."
Clearly, stevedores will tend to use customer-originated documenta-
tion because they will not want to stop the flow of transportation to
check and record the condition and quantity of the goods. Such
"dead time" does not earn the stevedore any money and may
increase the costs of the customer.
A third alternative that exists in Article 4(2) is to have the terminal
operator issue no document at all. In that event the operator "is
presumed to have received the goods in apparent good condition." 91
The only exception to this presumption is during immediate transfers
of goods between carriers, in which case no such presumption
applies. While the terminal operator may still be held liable under
Article 5 of the OTT Convention for undocumented transfers between
carriers, the absence of the presumption of having received the goods
in apparent good condition will affect the recovery of compensation
for damages. Clearly, this alternative will also appeal to the steve-
dores.
A question of clarification was raised at the conference as to
whether the absence of a presumption during immediate transfers of
goods between carriers in Article 4(2) meant that a conclusive
91Compare the statement in Article 11(1) that the operator is prima facie held to have
delivered the goods in good condition if the person entitled to delivery fails to give notice within
three days after delivery.
No objections were made at the diplomatic conference to the U.S. declaration that
"reasonable means of checking" does not include opening sealed containers. See Larsen,
Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, at 30. Article 4(2) notes a presumption of apparent good
condition but rejects that presumption for the immediate transfer of goods between modes. It
is expected that operators will not be interested in issuing their own documents under Article
4(l)(b), so that the "document" will be a carrier's waybill or bill of lading. The terminal
operator will not thereby be foreclosed from limiting its guaranty to "Shipper's Load and
Count" in the carrier's document.
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presumption might exist. The conference was of the view that no
presumption would attach to the operator and Article 4(2) was
adopted on the basis of that understanding. 92
A concern was expressed by Japan that customers of the terminal
operator might require the operator to issue a document even after
having brought a lawsuit for a claim against the operator. 93 The
conference agreed that the reference to issuance of a document
"within a reasonable period of time" stated in Article 4(1) would
preclude the problem described by the Japanese delegate. 94
b. Electronic Data Processing
Terminal operator documentation under the OTT Convention is
unusually well adapted to electronic data processing and constitutes
a ready model for the future law on bills of lading.
Article 4(3) provides that the customer's document or receipt
referred to in Article 4(l)(a), as well as the terminal operator's
document described in Article 4(l)(b), may be issued in any form that
generates a permanent record. 95 A computer record would satisfy the
documentary requirements of Article 4. This provision parallels the
provisions in Article l(e)-(f) making any "notice" and any "request"
acceptable if "made in a form which provides a record of the
information contained therein." Thus, whenever notices or requests
are required to be given under the OTT Convention, for whatever
purpose, they may be made electronically, if an electronic record is
available.
Article 4(3) states that electronic data interchange (EDI) messages
will satisfy the requirements of Article 4(1). 96 This is the first treaty
reference to EDI communications, which involve a computer-to-
computer communication system based on pre-arranged and agreed
terms of reference.
920.R. at 155-56, A/CONF.152/C.1/SR.6 at 2-6.
9 3AICONF. 152.C. I_.26.
94O.R. at 151, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.5 at 3-4.
95 Compare Montreal Protocol No. 4 to the Warsaw Convention, ICAO Doc. 9148, Article 3,
which will become new Article 5 of the Warsaw Convention (officially known as the Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 300, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11).
96Article 4(3) provides:
A document referred to in paragraph (1) may be issued in any form which preserves a
record of the information contained therein. When the customer and the operator have
agreed to communicate electronically, a document referred to in paragraph (1) may be
replaced by an equivalent electronic data interchange message.
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The conference noted that Article 4(2) provides not only that
electronic documentation is permitted ("any form which preserves a
record of the information"), but also that the document referred to in
Article 4(1) "may be replaced by an equivalent electronic data
interchange message." 97 These two sentences are not mutually
exclusive but are instead supplementary.
Article 4(4) provides that the signature referred to in Article 4(1)
"means a handwritten signature, its facsimile or an equivalent
authentication effected by any other means." It should be noted that
this is the same as Article 5(k) of the 1988 U.N. Convention on
International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory
Notes, 98 which is intended to facilitate international trade to the
greatest possible extent. By adopting the language of Article 5(k), the
OTT Convention accepts electronic signatures regardless of local law
restrictions on the use of electronic signatures. 99
5. Terminal Operators' Liability Regime
a. Fault Basis of Liability
Article 5(1) provides that fault of the terminal operator must be
proved before the operator can be held liable; however, the burden of
proof rests on the terminal operator to prove that "he, his servants or
agents or other persons of whose services the operator makes use"
took all reasonable measures to avoid the loss or damage to the
goods. Thus, the fault of the terminal operator for the occurrence
causing the loss, damage or delay is presumed unless the operator can
prove the absence of fault by the operator, its servants or agents or
other persons whose services are employed to perform transport-
related services.
The U.S. delegation stated at the conference that all the usual
factual (as opposed to policy-based) defenses to liability are implied
in the statement that the terminal operator is held to be at fault unless
proof to the contrary is shown. 100 Thus, if the operator proves that it
was not at fault, or that all reasonable measures were taken to avoid
the loss, damage or delay, the operator will not be held liable.
9'0.R. at 152, A/CONF/152/C.I/SR.5 at 7-8.
98UNGA Res. 43/165, XIX UNCITRAL Y.B. 173-86 (1988).
"Proposal of the U.S. delegation, A/CONF. 154/C. I/L. 10. Note the difference from Article
14(3) of the Hamburg Rules, supra note 18, which accepts signature by electronic means "if not
inconsistent with the law of the country where the document is signed."
'O'O.R. at 160-62, A/CONF.152.C.1/SR.8 at 6. See also the reference to the existence of
defenses from liability in Article 7(1).
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The terminal operator is only presumed liable for activities during
the period of time when the operator is responsible for the goods in
accordance with Article 3. A proposal to extend the terminal opera-
tor's period of responsibility to a reasonable time period after the
operator notifies the person entitled to take delivery that the goods
are available was not adopted. There was some feeling at the
conference that the proposal conflicted with Article 3, which clearly
limits the period of the operator's responsibility.10,
Proposals were made to the effect that the terminal operator should
not be presumed liable when damage is caused while the customer
had access to the goods within the terminal for the purpose of
inspecting, treating or otherwise handling the goods. In the end,
however, the conference concluded that in such circumstances the
terminal operator would be able to prove that it had taken all
reasonable measures and thus would not be held liable. 02 Conse-
quently, the terminal operator remains under a presumption of
liability for all occurrences.
The term "loss resulting from" refers to consequential damages. A
proposal to limit damages to the value of the goods was made but was
not adopted.10 3
b. Comparative Negligence
The terminal operator is only liable to the extent that such failure
causes loss, damage or delay. 0 4 Thus, the customer (shipper or
carrier) will be responsible to the extent that the customer's failure
causes loss, damage or delay. Because the burden of proof is on the
terminal operator to show the extent to which the operator's failure
did not cause the loss, damage or delay, the determination of
comparative negligence begins with a presumption of the operator's
fault.
101O.R. at 161-62, A/CONF. 152.C.1/SR.8 at 2-3.
102 0.R. at 159, ACONF.152/C.I/SR.7 at 4-6.
1030.R. at 161, ACONF.152/C.I/SR.7 at 8.
1°4Article 5(2) of the OT" Convention provides:
Where a failure on the part of the operator, his servants or agents or other persons of
whose services the operator makes use for the performance of transport-related services
to take the measures referred to in paragraph (1) combines with another cause to produce
loss, damage or delay, the operator is liable only to the extent that the loss resulting from
such loss, damage or delay is attributable to that failure, provided that the operator proves
the amount of the loss not attributable thereto.
For the origin of this formula see Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934), and Article
5(7) of the Hamburg Rules.
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c. Delay in Handing Over the Goods
The operator is liable for delay when it fails to hand over the goods
within the agreed time period, or, if no time period is stated in the
agreement, within a reasonable time after being asked to hand them
over. 
105
d. Presumption that the Goods are Lost
Failure to deliver the goods within 30 days of the agreed time or to
place the goods at the disposal of the person entitled to accept
delivery within 30 days after receiving a request for the goods entitles
that person to treat the goods as being lost and to make a claim for
loss of the goods.1o6
6. Limitation of Liability
a. Liability Limits for Loss and Damage
Liability limits are an unusually contentious issue in international
negotiations. The actual amounts of the limits normally are not
discussed in depth until the diplomatic conference because the limits
are a function of, and depend upon agreement on, many related
issues. Even at the diplomatic conference the figures may not be
settled until near the end. Establishment of the actual limits on
liability often reflects other negotiations regarding allocation of risks
of carriage, such as who has the burden of proof, whether the limits
are breakable, and what are the allowable defenses to liability. 10 7
05 Article 5(3) of the OTT Convention provides:
Delay in handing over the goods occurs when the operator fails to hand them over to or
place them at the disposal of a person entitled to take delivery of them within the time
expressly agreed upon or, in the absence of such agreement, within a reasonable time after
receiving a request for the goods by such person.
This is the presumed intention of the parties where there is no specific provision in the bill of
lading. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1845) (contract damages must
be within the contemplation of the parties). See also The Caledonia, 157 U.S. 124 (1895), and
S.S. Willdomino v. Citro Chemical Co., 272 U.S. 718 (1927).
'06Article 5(4) of the OTT Convention provides:
If the operator fails to hand over the goods to or place them at the disposal of a person
entitled to take delivery of them within a period of 30 consecutive days after the date
expressly agreed upon or, in the absence of such agreement, within a period of 30
consecutive days after receiving a request for the goods by such person, a person entitled
to make a claim for the loss of the goods may treat them as lost.
l07Compare the package deal of the Hamburg Rules conference, discussed in Congressional
Oversight Hearing, supra note 11, at 150-52.
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Limitation of liability is only one of several ways of allocating risks
between the terminal operator and its customers.
Because the OTT Convention fills a gap between the existing
transportation liability conventions, 10 8 the liability limits of the con-
necting transportation conventions must be considered to ensure that
the OTT Convention fits harmoniously into the overall transportation
network. On the other hand, the view was expressed by the U.S.
delegation' 09 that the limitation approach of any one of these con-
necting liability regimes was not necessarily appropriate for use in the
OTT Convention since the subject matter of the OTT Convention
differs from the other conventions. For example, there was no issue
of the defense of negligent navigation or management in the OTT
Convention, whereas preservation or suppression of the defense of
negligent navigation was a significant bargaining chip in the Hamburg
Rules negotiations. 110 Other relevant considerations in establishing
liability limits in the OTT Convention were the value of goods
handled by terminal operators, the costsf transport-related services,
insurance costs, the average level of damages awarded against
operators for loss of or damage to goods or for delay in handing over
goods, and the utility expenses of terminal operators."'
Liability limits, once established, become very difficult to adjust for
inflation erosion and other changes, such as improvements in the
local standard of living.112 To resolve the issue of revision of limits,
the U.S. delegation supported not only a separate article on revision
of liability limits but also sought to adjust the limits for inflation. The
limits in the 1989 draft text were selected as illustrative examples, but
proved to be impossible to change in 1991. They were the dual limits
of the Multimodal Convention," 3 adopted in 1980, that is, 8.33
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) per kilogram of weight except in
cases of maritime carriage, where the limit is 2.75 SDRs per kilogram.
"'
8See supra notes 4, 8, 24 and 98.
1°9See Larsen, Sweeney & Falvey, supra note 14, at 36-37.
"°O.R. at 39-40, A/CONF.152/7 at 14.
"'As is discussed infra in connection with Article 24, the diplomatic conference adopted a
list of items that are relevant for consideration in revising the limitation amounts.
"
2 The liability limits of the 1929 Warsaw Convention, see supra note 95, roughly $8,300 for
personal injury or death, have been very difficult to increase and have been a particularly vexing
problem for continued adherence by the U.S. At one point the U.S. took the drastic step of
denouncing the Warsaw Convention, only to withdraw its denunciation when a private
agreement among international carriers known as the Montreal Agreement increased the
amount to $75,000. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497 (1967).
113See supra note 24.
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If adjusted for inflation since 1980, those limits would be 11.5 SDRs
per kilogram for land transport and 3.15 SDRs per kilogram for
maritime transport. "14
The conference did not adopt the U.S. proposal for inflation
adjustment of the Multimodal Convention limits."5 Instead, liability
limits for the OTT Convention were adopted at the identical levels of
the Multimodal Convention. The result is that the liability limits of the
OTT Convention are dated as of 1980 and reflect cargo values as of
1980. The reason for not adopting the U.S. proposal was the wish of
the majority of the conference to keep costs low and to align the OTT
Convention with the existing transport conventions (the road and
maritime conventions) as much as possible.116 While the terminal
operators and their insurers probably favored these limits as being the
lowest possible, the shippers would have preferred to have the limits
adjusted for inflation in order to maintain the distribution of risk
between the cargo and the carriers and other handlers of the cargo.
The conference did adopt, however, an article on adjustment of
liability limits for inflation erosion." 7 Consequently, it will be possi-
ble to adjust for inflation erosion at the first meeting of the revision
committee. However, the committee may adjust only back to 1991,
when the OTT Convention was adopted. Adjustment back to 1980,
the date of the Multimodal Convention, cannot be made under the
fast-track procedure of Article 24. However, such backward adjust-
ment could be made under Article 23, the general amendment
procedure.
Japan proposed that "the total weight of the lost or damaged goods
and of the goods whose value is affected" should be taken into
consideration in establishing the limitation of liability. An example
would be a piece of machinery shipped in two packages; the loss of
one package would affect the value of the other. Therefore, the loss
of both packages should be considered in establishing the total
II4 See The Economic and Commercial Implications of The Entry into Force of the Hamburg
Rules and the Multimodal Convention, TD/B/C.4/315/Rev.l at 15, Congressional Oversight
Hearing, supra note 11, at 287. See also infra note 184 (discussion of "units of account").
15 0.R. at 166-68, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.8 and SR.9.
116See supra notes 8 and 24. The OTT Convention deals with gaps in coverage between
modes of transport by sea, rail, road and air. Thus, the best way to have a single limitation with,
at most, only one exception was to make a special provision for sea transport in Article 6(l)(b).
As a result, while the normal limit is 8.33 SDRs per kilogram, the limit is reduced to 2.75 SDRs
per kilogram when the terminal operator is in charge of the goods before or after sea transport.
The OTT Convention does not establish new and significant incentives to litigate whether
transportation is or is not by sea. The documentation will indicate whether sea transport is used.
117See infra text accompanying note 188 (discussing Article 24 of the OTT Convention).
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limitation of liability. The Japanese proposal was adopted, although
some delegates believed that the overall weight of the shipments should
be excluded in favor of the weight of the damaged goods only.18
The 1989 UNCITRAL plenary had decided to adopt dual limits:
one was the generally applicable limit of 8.33 SDRs per kilogram of
weight; the other was the exception, when maritime carriage is
involved, of 2.75 SDRs.119 At the diplomatic conference, several
delegations proposed a single limit on liability, regardless of the mode
of transportation. Some of these delegations favored adoption of the
low maritime limit as the single limit, while others favored adoption
of the higher land carriage limits as the single limit. There was no
consensus on this issue. 120
Germany proposed the introduction of an alternative limitation
based on the package doctrine of maritime law, following the example
of Article 6(2) of the Hamburg Rules. The German delegation
acknowledged that such a limitation might cause problems regarding
definition of a container as a package and would complicate the
documentation of the terminal operator. Nevertheless, the German
delegate suggested that the system of the Hamburg Rules should be
adopted for the OTT Convention in order to give the customer an
additional option. The majority of delegates, however, were of the view
that the package concept, especially as applied to containers, would
cause difficulties for both operators and customers and was not abso-
lutely necessary. The German proposal therefore was not adopted. 121
Germany further proposed a global limit on the terminal operator's
liability, a proposal also favored by the U.K. 122 Under this proposal, the
I 8 O.R. at 165, AICONF.152.C.I/SR.8 at 6.
19See the discussion of "units of account" infra note 184. Article 6(1) of the OTI'
Convention provides:
(a) The liability of the operator for loss resulting from loss or damage to goods according
to the provisions of Article 5 is limited to an amount not exceeding 8.33 units of account
[SDR] per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged.
(b) However, if the goods are handed over to the operator immediately after carriage by
sea or by inland waterways, or if the goods are handed over, or are to be handed over, by
him for such carriage, the liability of the operator for loss resulting from loss of or damage
to goods according to the provisions of Article 5 is limited to an amount not exceeding 2.75
units of account [SDR] per kilogram of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged. For the
purposes of this paragraph, carriage by sea or by inland waterways includes pick-up and
delivery within a port.
120O.R. at 165-68, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.8 and 9.
1 1O.R. at 171-73, A/CONF. 152/C.I/SR. 10. There are no package limits in air, rail and road
transportation. The terminal governed by the OTT" Convention is land-based and, as a result,
the special arguments about perils of the sea used to justify special treatment of sea transport
were not convincing.
1220.R. at 173-77, A/CONF. 152/C.I/SR.10.
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operator's total liability would be limited to 10 million SDRs, regardless
of circumstances. Such a global limit would impose an overall cap on
liability. The U.S. delegate stated12 3 that it was difficult to ascertain the
capacity of the insurance market and questioned whether 10 million
SDRs was realistic as a global limit when compared to the admitted
ability of the insurance industry to deal with catastrophic losses in the
range of $300-$500 million in other areas of transportation. After
extensive discussion, the proposal was not adopted.
b. Liability for Delay
The conference did not change the text of the draft convention
making the terminal operator liable for delay in an amount equivalent
to 22 times the charges of the operator for its services. However, the
applicable liability cannot exceed the total of charges for the entire
consignment of which the goods are a part.124
c. Aggregate Liability Limit
The conference agreed that the terminal operator shall in no case be
held liable for an amount in excess of the total value of the goods lost
or damaged. 25
d. Terminal Operators' Agreement on Increased Limits
Under Article 6(4), the terminal operator may agree with the
customer on liability limits higher than those provided under the
preceding paragraphs of Article 6. The Yugoslav delegation proposed
that such agreements on higher liability limits also should apply to the
operator's servants, agents and other persons of whose services it
makes use. The U.S. delegation expressed the view that servants,
agents and independent contractors should not be affected by the
terminal operator's contractual agreements to increase liability limits.
In line with this, other delegations expressed the view that only those
agreements that were compulsory should be governed by the OTT
1230.R. at 174-75, A/CONF. 152/C.2/SR.10.
1240.R. at 101, A/CONF.152/13 at 8. Liability for delay accords with current U.S. contract
law holding that only the most unlikely consequences are outside the contemplation of the
parties. See supra note 105. The delay damages provisions were among the non-controversial
elements of the Hamburg Rules (Article 6(l)(b)).
125This provision, also found in Article 6(l)(c) of the Hamburg Rules, comes from Article
111(3) of the Visby Amendments.
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Convention, whereas discretionary agreements, such as those per-
mitted under Article 6(4), should be outside the OTT Convention. As
a result of this discussion, the conference decided not to adopt the
proposal to extend the operator's agreements with the customer on
higher limits to the operator's servants, agents and persons of whose
services it makes use. 126
7. Non-Contractual Claims
The defenses and liability limits provided under the OTT Conven-
tion apply to all actions against the terminal operator regardless of
whether the actions are in tort, in contract or otherwise. 127
If such actions are brought against a terminal operator's servant,
agent or other person of whose services the operator makes use, the
latter are entitled to the same defenses and limits to which the
operator is entitled under the OTT Convention. 28 Initially, the
"other person" phrase was controversial because it went beyond the
formula contained in the Hamburg Rules. In the end, however, it was
adopted due to the fact that the circumstances of terminal operators
are sufficiently different to justify it.
When a claimant is able to recover both from the operator and from
its servants, agents, or other persons of whose services the operator
makes use, the aggregate or total recovery may not exceed the OTT
Convention's liability limitation. 29 The U.S. delegation proposed
that, insofar as servants, agents and other persons are concerned, the
aggregate limit should not be increased by the operator's contractual
agreements under Article 6(4) to increase the liability limits. 30 This
proposal was withdrawn, however, in view of the satisfactory reso-
lution of the issue during the discussion of Article 6(4).131
8. Breakability of the Liability Limits
Article 8(1) provides that the terminal operator's limitation on
liability may be set aside (or broken) when the terminal operator or its
servants or agents commit intentional acts causing loss, damage or
delay, or commit such acts recklessly and with knowledge that loss,
126 0.R. at 168, A/CONF. 152/C. I/SR.9.
'
27 See Article 7(1) of the OTT Convention.
1281d. at Article 7(2).
1291d. at Article 7(3). Note, however, the exception for intentional torts under Article 8.
130Citing the Multimodal Convention, supra note 24.
13 1A/CONF.152/C.I/L.14, O.R. at 179, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.II at 4.
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damage or delay probably will result. Article 8(2) provides for similar
breakability of the liability limits of the operator's servants, agents
and other persons of whose services the operator makes use for the
performance of transport-related services.
The Netherlands delegate, although willing to accept the principle in
Article 8 providing for breakability of liability limitation when a terminal
operator commits an intentional tort,132 proposed that the terminal
operator should not be held responsible for the intentional torts of its
servants and agents. The U.S. delegation, although agreeing that break-
ing liability limitation was justified only in extreme cases,133 argued that
since servants and agents doing sensitive work (such as handling jewelry
or currency) normally are bonded, the Netherlands' proposal should not
be accepted. 34 The U.S. delegate also reminded the conference that
since most terminal operators are corporations that act only through
servants and agents it was both prudent and necessary to attribute their
acts to their employing corporations. On the other hand, the U.S.
delegation supported the view that intentional torts by independent
contractors hired by terminal operators should not expose terminal
operators to the loss of limited liability. In the end, the Netherlands'
proposal was not adopted.135
The German delegation proposed that the terminal operator's
servants and agents should have the burden of proving that they acted
within the scope of their employment. 36 The U.S. delegation ex-
pressed the view that this would be far out of line with the way other
businesses are treated under the doctrine of respondeat superior in
the law of many nations and that no justification existed for such a
departure. If an act is done with the intent to cause loss, damage or
delay, then the terminal operator, as the servant's or agent's em-
ployer, should remain responsible. 3 7 After a lengthy discussion, the
German proposal was not adopted. 38
9. Transport-Related Services to Dangerous Goods
Article 9 provides special liability rules for transport-related serv-
ices to dangerous goods. This article is, in effect, an exception to
1320.R. at 179, A/CONF. 152/C. I/SR. 11 at 4, A/CONF. 152/C. 1/L.25.
'
330.R. at 180, AICONF.152/C.I/SR.II at 6.
134See supra text accompanying note 40.
'
350.R. at 181, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.II at 5-6.
'
3 6 A/CONF. 152/C. 1/L.3, O.R. at 180-81, A/CONF. 152/C. I/SR. 11 at 6-8.
137Id. See supra text accompanying note 40. The operator would have the advantage of the
practice that a party must first prove that it is entitled to benefits before receiving such benefits.
138 d.
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Article 5, the liability regime governing the terminal operator's
transport-related services. Article 9 gives the operator not only the
right to dispose of and even to destroy dangerous goods without
liability (as the circumstances may require), but also the right to
receive compensation for damages from the person (manufacturer,
shipper or forwarder) who was legally obligated to label the goods and
to inform the operator of the dangerous nature of the goods.
Belgium and some other delegations were of the view that Article
9 places an unduly heavy burden of proof on the operator to show that
it did not know about the dangerous condition of the goods. The
conference decided, however, that Article 9 merely tests whether the
operator actually knew of the dangerous condition at the time of
receipt. 139
The Finnish delegation favored a more straightforward obligation
on the customer to inform the operator of the dangerous nature of the
goods and of the precautions to be taken in handling them.140 Other
delegations pointed out, however, that the customer (in particular the
carrier) sometimes does not know the exact nature of the goods
because the goods have been labeled (sometimes inaccurately) by the
manufacturer, who is further back in the chain of transportation.
Thus, it is difficult to enforce an obligation to inform the terminal
operator of the dangerous nature of the goods. As a result of the
discussion, the Finnish proposal was not adopted.' 4'
The Swedish delegate asked whether the right to destroy goods
would be justified not only by imminent danger to persons but also to
property; that is, whether potential environmental damage would
entitle the operator to destroy goods. The chair stated that, in his
view, environmental protection is included in the Article 9(a) refer-
ence to "when the goods pose an imminent danger to any person or
property." 142
Several delegations supported a proposal143 by the observer from
the United Nations Environment Program to establish a firm obliga-
tion within Article 9 to label, package and document goods in
conformity with international and domestic rules and regulations and
to condition the operator's precautionary measures (disposal and
destruction) on the failure to observe such rules and regulations.
Most delegations, including the U.S. delegation, believed that the
1390.R. at 181-82, A/CONF. 152/C. 1/SR. 11 at 7-9.
140O.R. at 182-83, AICONF.152.C.I/SR.II at 9-11.
14 11d.
1421d. (emphasis added).
1430.R. at 184-85, AICONF.152/C.I/SR.11 at 2-5.
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application of the OTT Convention should be limited to those
circumstances confronting the operator; otherwise, the OTT Conven-
tion would become the only legal instrument compelling the obser-
vance of rules and regulations on labeling, packaging and document-
ing the conformity of goods to those rules and regulations. 144
10. Terminal Operator's Rights to Retain and Sell Goods
a. Right to Retain Goods for Costs and Claims
The operator may retain goods to satisfy charges relating to them
both while they are in the operator's custody and afterwards. 4 5 For
example, the operator may satisfy charges against goods that remain
at the terminal after the period of responsibility has expired. The
operator also may, in accordance with local law, enter into contrac-
tual arrangements with the customer to extend the operator's security
in the goods to, for example, other goods in the terminal belonging to
the same customer.
The German delegation proposed that the terminal operator also
should have the right to retain the goods as security for transport-
related services performed after its period of responsibility (as
defined by Article 3) has expired. For example, charges might be
incurred for storage of goods being held while waiting for the
consignee to pick them up. The German delegate confirmed that the
terminal operator would be governed by the duty of care required
under local law during such additional period after the convention
period of responsibility, as defined by Article 3, had ended. This
proposal was adopted.'4 6
Consequently, in voting for Article 10, the U.S. delegation stated
its interpretation that the terminal operator may retain goods for
satisfaction of unpaid charges that are due for keeping the goods, both
during the period of its responsibility and thereafter. Thus, the
144Id.
145Article 10(1) does not establish any new substantive legal right of retention. As suggested
by the German delegate at the conference (his interpretation was not controverted), Article
10(1) is a conflicts of law provision recognizing that national law, whatever it may be, applies.
O.R. at 186, A.CONF.152/C.I/SR.lI at 6-8. No delegation, including the U.S. delegation,
advocated, encouraged or promoted a lien on cargo for charges due the terminal if those charges
have been paid by the cargo (shipper) to the ocean carrier and not paid by the carrier to the
terminal. No such lien could exist unless previously authorized by national law. Needless to
say, as discussed supra note 75, the U.S. government should note this history in its ratification
and implementing legislation.
146Id. The U.S. proposal to place a limit on the time goods may be left at the terminal was
not adopted. O.R. at 40, A/CONF.152/7 at 15. But see infra note 157.
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operator can claim damages for storage after the operator has placed
the goods at the disposal of the person entitled to receive them.147
b. Guarantee for Charges Owed to the Terminal Operator
Article 10(2) provides that the customer may deposit a sufficient
guarantee as security for charges owed. After such deposit, the
terminal operator may no longer retain the goods as security.
c. Terminal Operator's Right to Sell the Goods
Under Article 10(3), the terminal operator is entitled to sell the
goods to satisfy outstanding charges. Such a sale may take place only
if permitted under the local law of the State where the goods are
located. The right to sell does not apply to containers, pallets or
similar articles of transport that are either leased from or belong to a
party other than the terminal operator or the shipper. To qualify for
this exception, the name of the owners of the leased equipment must
be clearly marked on the equipment. Even if a right of sale does not
exist under local law, the terminal operator nevertheless may recover
any charges for repairs to such clearly marked equipment. 148 This
provision is the only surviving aspect of the UNIDROIT safe-keeping
terminal operator (its genesis having come from UNIDROIT's Ho-
telkeepers' Draft Convention). In the UNCITRAL Working Group
and the Plenary Commission it always was very controversial.
The German delegation proposed total deletion of Article 10(3)149
and suggested that the issue of sale of the goods and the operator's
rights in leased equipment should be governed entirely by local law.
The IICL observer stated that there are approximately 6.2 million
20-foot equivalent units of containers in the world that are perma-
nently marked with the owner's code and registered with the Inter-
national Container Bureau. Furthermore, each such container has an
individual number. 150
147 0.R. at 123, A/CONF.152/SR.7 at 4.
14Article 10(3) of the OTT Convention provides that the terminal operator may not sell
leased containers to satisfy charges against goods being stored in leased containers "except in
respect of claims by the operator for the cost of repairs of or improvements to the containers,
pallets or similar articles of transport or packaging."
1490.R. at 187-88, A/CONF.152/C. I/SR. 12 at 8-12.
1501d. The majority of leased containers are U.S.-owned, which is the reason why the U.S.
had a special interest in this issue at the conference.
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The observer pointed out that containers are permanent means of
transport rather than goods and are regulated by the Customs Conven-
tion on Containers, which allows containers to enter and leave a country
without payment of duty. One half of the world's containers are leased,
with the duration of leases varying from two months to five years. Aside
from those containers owned by container leasing companies, the next
greatest number of containers are held by state-owned railways. While
under lease, the leasing company does not know the location of its
containers since they are leased from one of approximately 1,000
container depots and returned to such depots. The IICL did not want
these depots to be defined as transport terminals.'15
The IICL observer noted that the major problem facing a container
lessor occurs when a shipping line becomes bankrupt and leaves leased
containers at a terminal. That is the problem that Article 10(3) is
intended to resolve. It does so by providing that leased containers may
not be sold to satisfy charges against the bankrupt shipping line. 152
The IICL observer stated further that if the German proposal to
delete Article 10(3) were to be accepted, the issue of whether leased
containers could be sold to satisfy charges against the goods would be
governed by local law. Under local law in the U.S. and the laws of
other States, it is not clear whether leased containers can be sold to
satisfy charges against the goods. Under German law, it is clear that
the leased containers may not be sold to satisfy such charges.
Another reason to support the paragraph in the text was that it
codified the legal status of leased containers worldwide. Conse-
quently, the IICL-favored Article 10(3) as drafted. 53
The U.S. delegation supported the views of the IICL and reminded
the conference that container lessors already have to deal with many
different laws (at least 50 different laws in the U.S. alone). Conse-
quently, the U.S. delegation supported maximum unification of the
law governing the status of containers.
The Mexican delegation stated that deletion of the provision
subjecting a sale to satisfy charges against the goods to "the law of
the State where the goods are located" would create a constitutional
problem of "due process" for Mexico. Consequently, after extensive
discussion, the German proposal was rejected and the text remained
as drafted.154
15 10.R. at 188, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.12 at 8-12.
1521d.
153 1d.1140.R. at 189, A/CONF. 152/C.1I/SR. 12 at 11-12.
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The delegation from Morocco proposed that empty containers
should be clearly defined as being "goods" for the purposes of the
OTT Convention. Under this proposal, the terminal operator would
be able to treat them as goods and would be able to exercise a right
of retention over them in the same way that it exercised retention
over goods. 55 The IICL observer strongly objected to this proposal
because, in the IICL's view, there should not be any right to sell
containers, whether empty or full, belonging to a third party not
involved in the terminal operator's claim. The IICL also believed that
empty containers should not be defined as goods because, if they
were so defined, the existing container depots might be defined as
terminals. The delegation from China agreed that empty containers
should not be treated as goods for the purpose of the OTT Conven-
tion, and the U.S. delegation agreed with China. Due to the absence
of support, the Moroccan delegate withdrew the proposal. 56
d. Notice of Sale to the Owner of Goods
Article 10(4) provides that the terminal operator shall give reason-
able notice of an intended sale of goods to the owner, to the person
from whom it received the goods, and to the person entitled to take
delivery. Furthermore, the terminal operator must account for any
excess proceeds from the sale. In all other respects, the rights of sale
are governed by the local law of the State where the goods are
located. 157
The delegate from Morocco proposed that the terminal operator
should only have to give notice to one of the three parties mentioned
above. However, most delegates believed that the notice require-
ments as drafted were not excessive because the terminal operator is
only required to "make reasonable efforts" to give notice. As such,
the Moroccan proposal was not adopted.15 8
The U.S. delegation introduced a proposal to grant terminal
operators the right of security in, and subsequent right of sale of,
unclaimed or abandoned goods at the terminal in order to satisfy
1550.R. at 190, A/CONF. 152/C.I/SR.13 at 1-2.
1561d.
1570.R. at 191, A.CONF.152/C.I/SR.13 at 2-3. Compare the discussion supra note 79 and
accompanying text of Article l(b) of the OTT Convention. The conclusion of this discussion
clearly supports the view expressed by the U.S. that container depots are not transport
terminals. The related issue of whether empty containers abandoned by the lessor at a terminal
can be retained or sold by the terminal operator for charges was not discussed and is an open
question.
1580.R. at 191, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.13 at 3.
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unpaid charges. 159 The U.S. proposal would have established uniform
law governing such goods. Although this proposal was supported by
Mexico, Canada, Belgium and Sweden, it was rejected in a close vote
with eleven votes in favor, twelve opposed, and nine abstentions.160
11. Notice to the Terminal Operator that the Goods Have Been
Lost, Damaged or Delayed
a. Notice of Apparent Loss or Damage
Article 11(1) gives the customer three working days to notify the
terminal operator of apparent loss or damage to the goods.161 The
three day limit begins to run when the goods are handed over to the
person entitled to take delivery. If that person fails to give notice
within three days, the document issued by the operator under Article
4(l)(b) will constitute prima facie evidence of delivery. If no such
document is issued, the goods are presumed to have been delivered in
good condition unless notice to the contrary is given within three
working days. 162 The delegation from Morocco proposed that the
person entitled to delivery should give three days notice beginning at
the time when the goods are handed over "or placed at the disposal
of" such person. This proposal was not adopted. 63
b. Notice to the Terminal Operator of Concealed Loss or Damage
to the Goods
Article 11(2) provides that in those circumstances when "the loss
or damage is not apparent," the person entitled to delivery must give
notice within 15 consecutive days after delivery of the goods. The
same prima facie evidence rule described under Article 11(1) exists
590.R. at 191-92, A/CONF.152/C.2/SR.13 at 3-4.
'60O.R. at 191-94, A.CONF.152/C.I/SR.13 at 7. It should be noted that the conference
amendment to Article 10(1) permits the operator to retain the goods "during the period of his
responsibility for them and thereafter." The effect of this amendment is, in part, what the U.S.
delegation had sought: the right of security in goods abandoned at the terminal.
161Article 11(1) of the OTT Convention provides:
Unless notice of loss or damage, specifying the general nature of the loss or damage, is
given to the operator not later than the third working day after the day when the goods
were handed over by the operator to the person entitled to take delivery of them, the
handing over is prima facie evidence of the handing over by the operator of the goods as
described in the document issued by the operator pursuant to paragraph (l)(b) of Article
4 or, if no such document was issued, in good condition.
16 20.R. at 192-94, A/CONF.152/C. /SR. 13 at 7-10.
163 1d.
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for concealed damage under Article 11(2), if notice is not given within
15 days. In those cases where goods do not reach the final recipient
until a considerable time after the goods have left the terminal, the 15
day time period may not begin to run until as late as 60 consecutive
days after the goods are handed over by the terminal operator.
The Moroccan delegate proposed the same amendment to Article
11(2) as she had proposed for 11(1), that is, to add the point in time
when the goods are placed at the disposal of the person entitled to
receive delivery as a point from which to measure the 15 day notice
period; once again, this proposal was not adopted. 64
The Japanese delegation proposed that the "final recipient" should
be described as one "who is in a position to inspect" the goods. Most
delegations understood this proposed addition to be a limiting clause,
that is, a person could only be a final recipient if he was in a position
to inspect the goods. In view of this understanding, the proposal was
withdrawn. 165
c. Participation in Survey or Inspection of the Goods
An exception to the notice requirement exists when the goods are
surveyed and inspected by the terminal operator at the time when
they are delivered to the person entitled to take delivery.16 6
d. Reasonable Facility for Inspection of the Goods
Where the goods are thought to be lost or damaged, the operator,
the carrier, and the person entitled to receive delivery must provide
reasonable facilities for inspection and tally of the goods.
Originally, the carrier was to have been excluded from Article
11(4). The delegate from Morocco proposed that the carrier also
should be obligated to provide reasonable facilities for inspection of
the goods. Other delegations objected in principle to adding the
carrier because the carrier may not be in a contractual relationship
with the person entitled to take delivery of the goods and therefore
may not have a contractual obligation to provide facilities for inspec-
tion and tally of the goods. For that reason, the U.S. delegation did
not support the proposal. The conference, however, felt that the
addition would not in any way modify Article 15, which provides that
164Id.
165See Article 11(3) of the OTT Convention.
166See Article 11(4) of the OTT Convention.
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the OTT Convention does not change the rights or duties arising
under other international transportation conventions or laws giving
effect to such conventions. As a result, the proposal was adopted.167
e. Notice of Delay in Delivery
Finally, Article 11(5) provides that a loss caused by a delay in
delivery shall not be compensable unless the terminal operator
receives notice within 21 consecutive days after the day the goods are
delivered to the person entitled to delivery.
12. Time Limitations for Bringing Judicial or Arbitral Actions
Most recent transportation conventions provide for a two year
period of limitations for bringing judicial or arbitral proceedings.
Article 12(1) is aligned with those conventions. 168 Although proposals
to shorten the period to one year were made, they were not
adopted. 169
Under Article 12(2), the limitations period begins to run on the day
the terminal operator delivers the goods to the person entitled to
delivery. In cases of total loss, however, the period commences on
the day that the person entitled to delivery receives notice that the
goods are lost. In accordance with Article 5(4), the earlier of these
two alternative periods prevails. The "day on which the limitation
period commences is not included in the period."' 170
Germany proposed that, in cases of total loss, the limitation period
should begin on the day that the "person entitled to make a claim
receives notice from the operator that the goods are lost." This
proposal was adopted, although doubt remains as to what will happen
if the operator refuses to accept such notice.' 7'
The terminal operator may extend the period for bringing judicial or
arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, recourse actions by carriers or
other persons against the terminal operator may be instituted after the
two year limitation period if "instituted within 90 days after the
'
67 0.R. at 195, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.13 at 7-10.
168See Article 20 of the Hamburg Rules and Article 25 of the Multimodal Convention. It
should also be noted that in the 1977 British Hague Rules Agreement between cargo insurers
and P & I Clubs the time bar was extended to two years. See W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims
1235, 1236-37 (3d ed. 1988).
'
69 0.R. at 196-97, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.14 at 3-4.
17°See Article 12(3) of the OTT Convention.
'
7 10.R. at 200, A/CONF.152.C.I/SR.13 at 4-10.
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carrier or other person has been held liable in an action against
himself or has settled the claim upon which such action was based"
and if notice of such a claim was given to the operator within a
reasonable time after the claim was filed against the carrier or other
person resulting in a recourse action against the operator.172
The delegation from Morocco proposed that the 90 day period for
recourse actions be shortened to 30 days after the carrier or other
person has been sued to protect terminal operators from protracted
litigation. The conference reviewed the history of such recourse
actions, particularly those under the Visby Rules (Article 1(3)), the
Multimodal Convention (Article 25(4)), and, finally, the Hamburg
Rules (Article 20(5)), which permit recourse actions "if instituted
within the time allowed by the laws of the State where proceedings
are instituted." A proposal was made by the Italian delegation to
align Article 12(5) with the Hamburg Rules. The Swedish delegation
stated that national law might not provide for recourse actions at all.
At the end of extensive discussion the conference approved Article
12(5) without making any changes.173
Finally, the U.S. delegation proposed that "written notices" be
replaced by "notices," which are defined in Article 1(e) as including
electronic communications. This proposal was adopted.174
13. Non-Derogation Provisions
Article 13 provides that the terminal operator may not enter into
contractual stipulations derogating the provisions of the OTT Con-
vention. The invalidity of such contractual stipulations does not
invalidate the remainder of any contract with the operator. Nonethe-
less, the operator may enter into contractual stipulations increasing
its responsibilities and obligations under the OTT Convention. The
chairman stated that the phrasing at the beginning of Article 13,
"Unless otherwise provided in this Convention," refers to the
specific statement in Article 6(4) that the terminal operator may agree
to limits of liability in excess of those established in Article 6.175
172See Article 12(5) of the OTT Convention.
170.R. at 197-99, A/CONF.152.C.1/SR.13 at 4-10. See also supra note 24 (discussing the
Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Convention).
1740.R. at 200, A/CONF.152/7 at 13, A/CONF.152/C. 1/SR. 14 at 10.
1750.R. at 200-01, A/CONF.152/C.I/SR.16 at.3.
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14. Uniform Interpretation of the OTT Convention
Article 14 provides that the parties to the OTT Convention shall
take into consideration the need to establish uniformity of application
and the international character of the OTT Convention. This follows
the simple formulation in the 1989 draft of the OTT Convention, taken
from the Hamburg Rules, rather than the more complex formula
contained in the CISG.176
15. Relationship of the OTT Convention to Other Transportation
Conventions
As finally approved, Article 15 provides that the OTT Convention
"does not modify any rights or duties which may arise under an
international convention relating to the international carriage of
goods" to which a State Party to the OTT Convention is also bound;
neither does the OTT Convention modify any rights or duties arising
under any law of a Party State that gives "effect to a convention
relating to the international carriage of goods."' 177
The conference reviewed at length the history of Article 15. The
UNCITRAL working group, at the insistence of Germany, had felt
that the draft convention should be subordinated not only to the
relevant international treaties but also to national law implementing
international transport conventions, whether or not ratified by the
State, because of those Scandinavian states that have adopted the
Visby Amendments only by domestic law.178 Based on this principle,
the working group had adopted language that the OTT Convention
should be subordinated to any law of a Party State "giving effect to
or derived from a convention relating to the international carriage of
goods."' 179 The words "derived from" referred to laws of States
"derived from" international transportation conventions by States
that had not become party thereto. The UNCITRAL working group
had agreed that the words "derived from" did not subordinate the
OTT Convention to laws which were not derived from international
transportation conventions.180 Nevertheless, there was concern in the
U.S. Department of State that unilaterally-enacted domestic law
176See Article 7 of the CISG, supra note 19.
'"See the discussion of Article 15 of the OTT Convention supra notes 58-77 and
accompanying text.
178A/CN.9/298, paragraph 77.
'
79A/CONF. 152/5 at 8.
18A/44/17, paragraph 162; A/CONF.C. /SR. 15 at 2-11.
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could supersede the OTT Convention without formal denunciation,
leading to chaotic uncertainty.
The U.S. delegation pointed out that Article 15 would not be
necessary if a satisfactory subordination of the OTT Convention were
achieved by definition of terminal operator in Article 1. The delega-
tions of Denmark and Sweden stated that Article 15 was needed and
disagreed with the U.S. view that Article 15 could be taken to suggest
that any national law could take precedence over the OTT Conven-
tion. In their views, the understanding of the matter expressed by
UNCITRAL at its twenty-second session fully answered the con-
cerns expressed by the U.S. delegation.181 Because the conference
agreed with Denmark and Sweden, it voted by a large margin to
delete the phrase "or derived from" in Article 15.182
The outcome of the discussion brought Article 15 of the OTT
Convention into line with the Visby and the Hamburg Rules, both of
which have narrowly-drawn provisions to allow named transportation
conventions to be adopted as national legislation without the need to
ratify the named conventions. 83 Consequently, the U.S. delegation
supported the change in Article 15.
16. Units of Account
Article 16 provides that the liability limits are to be measured in
units of account. For members of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the units of account equal the IMF's SDRs. For non-IMF
members, the units are stated in their national currencies in amounts
equivalent in real value to SDRs.184
17. Depositary
The U.N. Secretary General is the sole depositary of the OTT
Convention.
181A/44/17, paragraph 162.
182 0.R. at 202-07, A/CONF.C.1/SR.15 at 2-11.
18 31d.
'94This formulation of "units of account" differs from that contained in Article 26 of the
Hamburg Rules and the 1979 SDR Protocol to the Hague Rules. See also supra note 95 (the SDR
Protocol to the Warsaw Convention). The real value alternative formula in these conventions
was drafted to accommodate the needs of the U.S.S.R. and its clientele states. The formulation
in the OTT Convention is the closest to date of a direct use of the SDR to measure liability
limits. See generally Larsen, New Work in UNCITRAL on Stable, Inflation-Proof Liability
Limits, 48 J. Air L. & Com. 665, 677-78 (1983). This change has become possible because China
and the U.S.S.R. have joined the IMF. See United Nations, UNCITRAL: The United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law 40-41 (1986).
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18. Signature, Ratification, Acceptance, Approval and Accession
The OTT Convention remained open for signature until April 30,
1992. Signatory states may ratify, accept or approve the OTT
Convention. States that are not signatories may accede to the OTT
Convention. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval and
accession are to be deposited with the U.N. Secretary General.
France, Mexico, the Philippines and Spain signed the OTT Con-
vention at the diplomatic conference. The U.S. signed the OTT
Convention on April 30, 1992.185 As of July 1, 1994, no State had
ratified the OTT Convention.
19. Federal-State Clause
Article 19 provides that States having two or more territorial units
with different laws may limit the application of the OTT Convention
to less than all its territorial units. This provision met the needs of
Canada, which will be able to apply the OTT Convention to fewer
than all of its Provinces.
20. Declarations of Application to Territorial Units
Article 20 provides that the declarations made by States regarding
application of the OTT Convention to territorial units under Article 19
may be made at the time of signature and may be confirmed at the
time of ratification. Such declarations may be withdrawn at any time.
Withdrawal takes effect six months after receipt of the withdrawal
notification by the depositary.
21. Reservations to the OTT Convention
The OTT Convention does not permit any reservations.186
'Although the U.S. has signed the OTT Convention, it has not yet submitted it to the
Senate for advice and consent.
'16O.R. at 214-16, A.CONF.152/C.2/SR.I at 1-2 and SR.2 at 1-2. As explained supra notes
7-13, at the last minute the U.S. delegation proposed a narrow reservation to preserve the
Himalaya clause for U.S. stevedores. Although this proposal was rejected, as explained supra
notes 58-77 and accompanying text, the Himalaya clause was preserved through a different
avenue. Neither the Hague Rules nor the Visby Amendments discuss reservations. No
reservations are permitted in the Hamburg Rules, the Multimodal Convention, the CISG, or the
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
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22. Entry Into Force of the OTT Convention
Most delegations, including that of the U.S., were of the view that
requiring a large number of ratifications for entry into force had
tended to frustrate entry into force of several other transportation
conventions. These delegations believed that if UNCITRAL's work
was important enough to complete, then the product of this work, the
OTT Convention, should not be frustrated by the requirement of an
excessively large number of States for entry into force. Because this
point of view prevailed, the OTT Convention will enter into force one
year from the first day of the month after the deposit of the fifth
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.187
23. Amendment of the OTT Convention
The depositary is required to convene a conference of Contracting
States to amend the OTT Convention if so requested by at least
one-third of the States Parties. After such amendment, any subse-
quent ratifications are deemed to be of the OTT Convention as
amended.
24. Revision of the OTT Convention's Liability Limits
Article 24 provides for a fast-track amendment of the OTT Con-
vention's liability limits. This is in recognition of the fact that inflation
tends to erode the level of compensation for loss, damage or delay
and that the liability limits will likely need adjustment sooner than
other aspects of the OTT Convention. As a consequence, the
depositary must convene a meeting of a revision committee consist-
ing of Contracting States at the request of one-fourth of the States
Parties.
The OTT Convention establishes criteria for the committee's
determination as to whether the liability limits should be amended. In
particular, the following items are to be considered: (1) the amounts
by which other transportation conventions have been amended, (2)
the value of the goods, (3) the cost of transport-related services, (4)
'
87A.CONF.152/7 at 16, O.R. at 214-15, A.CONF.152/C.2/SR.1 at 2-3. The Hague Rules
came into force in 1931 with four ratifications. The Hamburg Rules required 20 before entering
into force in 1992. The Multimodal Convention requires 30. UNCLOS, which will come into
force in November 1994, required 60 ratifications, but it is a public law convention that makes
changes in existing treaty and customary international law.
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changes in insurance rates, (5) changes in the average level of
damages, and (6) the cost of electricity, fuel and other utilities.
Amendments to the liability limits require adoption by a two-thirds
majority. Amendments may be adopted by tacit acceptance; that is,
the amendments will be deemed to have been accepted after an 18
month period unless, within that time, not less than one-third of the
States communicate to the depositary that they do not accept the
amendment. Such an amendment goes into effect for all Party States
unless a State denounces the OTT Convention. A State that becomes
a party after amendment becomes a party to the amended OTT
Convention. 188 The applicable liability limits are those in effect at the
time when the loss, damage or delay occurred.
25. Denunciation of the OTT Convention
Article 25 provides that a State Party may denounce the OTT
Convention at any time. A denunciation takes effect one year after
the depositary has been notified. The only exception is that denun-
ciation by a State Party in connection with an increase in the liability
limit under Article 24(8) takes effect when the amended liability limit
enters into force.
VI.
PRO AND CONTRA OF THE OTT CONVENTION
It is difficult to visualize all of the circumstances in which users of
the OTT Convention's regime would or would not benefit from
adoption of it by the U.S. The following is a survey of how the OTT
Convention might affect its users in the most obvious cases.
A. U.S. Stevedores and Other Terminal Operators.
Pro:
1. The Administration would submit to Congress the U.S. state-
ment made at the diplomatic conference that stevedores and terminal
operators, by virtue of Article 15, retain the option to seek the
188See Larsen, supra note 184, at 683-87. Article 20 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
Treaties has a tacit acceptance provision for reservations. The International Maritime Organi-
zation Treaty also has a tacit acceptance provision for amendments. See Article VII, IMO
Treaty, as amended, TIAS No. 4044 (1948), TIAS No. 10374 (1975).
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benefits of the maritime carrier under COGSA. 189 Thus, the statement
would become legislative history and also would be submitted with
the U.S. ratification to the depositary as the U.S. understanding of
the OTT Convention. Only U.S. courts would be affected by the
implementing legislation; they would have access to and would act
consistently with the legislative history and the U.S. understanding.
2. The OTT Convention would fill the gaps between the existing
legal regimes.
3. In situations where the carrier refuses to extend its COGSA
rights to the stevedore or the terminal operator, or when the Hima-
laya clause in the maritime bill of lading is too broad to satisfy the test
of Herd,190 the stevedore would avoid being subject to U.S. state law
if the OTT Convention was in place.
4. The stevedores' use of documentation is easy under the OTT
Convention because stevedores may use the carriers' documentation
without having to stop the flow of the goods to ascertain the condition
and quantity of the goods. The stevedore also may issue a separate
document. 19'
5. The legal regime of the OTT Convention is close to the existing
related transportation regimes. 192
6. The OTT Convention establishes uniformity and predictability
of law.
7. Under the OTT Convention, the risk is defined and, thus,
easier and possibly cheaper to insure.
8. Under the OTT Convention, stevedores will not have to insure
for the uncertainty that the goods may be subject to liability under the
laws of the fifty states, because the goods will not be subject to state
law. Thus, stevedores may save money.
9. The OTT Convention is adaptable to EDI.193
10. The OTT Convention would facilitate international trade be-
cause it would establish a uniform and predictable international
liability regime.
11. There would be less temptation to litigate under the OTT
Convention because the liability regime would be more uniform and
predictable.
189 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
19°See supra note 58.
19 1See Article 4 of the OT17 Convention, discussed supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
192See supra notes 8 and 24. The liability limitation is close to the maritime limit if carriage
is maritime and close to the European truck and rail conventions' limits if carriage is by truck
and rail.
193See Article 4(3) of the OTT Convention.
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Contra:
1. Stevedores and terminal operators have adjusted to the existing
legal situation by buying insurance for the uncertainties.
2. Insurance cost is related to claims experience. It is uncertain
whether the insurance costs of stevedores and terminal operators will
increase under the OTT Convention given its presumption of fault
and the breakability of liability limits in cases of intentional torts
under Article 8.
B. Shippers
Pro:
1. The OTT Convention fills the gaps between the existing legal
regimes.
2. Under the OTT Convention, shippers may have an easier time
recovering because the burden is on the terminal operator to prove
that the terminal operator was not negligent.
3. Under the OTT Convention, U.S. shippers will be assured that
foreign stevedores cannot exculpate themselves from liability.1 94
4. Shippers will not have to over-insure for uncertain risks under
the OTT convention.
5. There would be less temptation to litigate under the OTT
Convention because the liability regime is more uniform and predict-
able.
6. Shippers will experience easy and cheap EDI under the OTT
Convention.
7. The OTT Convention establishes uniformity and predictability
of law.
8. The OTT Convention will induce and facilitate international
trade.
Contra:
1. The existing legal arrangement works. Shippers are able to buy
insurance to compensate for gaps and uncertainties in the system.
2. Shippers would lose the possibility of recovery under state law
because the OTT Convention would supersede state law. 95
194See supra notes 53, 55 and 56. This is a problem in some countries, notably Australia,
Germany and Japan.
195See supra note 9 (discussing Colgate).
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C. Carriers
Pro:
1. The OTT Convention's liability regime approximates the regime
of maritime carriage for maritime carriers and approximates the air,
road and rail regimes for non-maritime carriers.
2. Under the OTT Convention, carriers will have the assurance
that stevedores cannot exculpate themselves from liability. Conse-
quently, in some foreign ports, stevedores will have to pay compen-
sation for loss, damage and delay that they have caused where
previously they would have been totally exculpated.196
3. Carriers will have less reason for concern as to the liability of
independent contractors.
4. There would be less litigation under the OTT Convention
because it establishes uniformity and predictability in the law.
5. The OTT Convention primarily envisions use of carrier docu-
mentation by stevedores in the stevedores' dealings with non-affili-
ated terminal operators.
6. The OTT Convention establishes uniformity and predictability
of law.
7. The OTT Convention will induce and facilitate international trade.
Contra:
Carriers have adjusted to the existing legal regime by buying
insurance for uncertainties.
D. Cargo and Liability Insurers
Pro:
1. Under the OTT Convention, the risk of carriage would become
defined and, thus, easier to insure.
2. Significant amounts of liability and cargo insurance would continue
to be sold.
3. Insurers would avoid the uncertainties inherent in the application
of state law and, in particular, would avoid the result in Colgate. 97
4. There would be less temptation to litigate under the OTT Conven-
tion because it would establish a uniform and predictable liability regime.
196Id. See also supra note 57.
197See supra note 9.
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5. Insurers would not have to be concerned about foreign steve-
dores exculpating themselves.
Contra:
The existing legal regime works and insurers are able to provide
insurance to cover uncertainties.
E. Port Authorities
Pro:
1. Certainty and predictability of the law would be advantageous to
port authorities as operators of terminals.
2. Uniformity of law and less litigation make port business more
attractive because customers of the port are more certain of clear
compensation for loss, damage and delay of goods.
3. The OTT Convention will induce and facilitate international
trade from which all ports would benefit.
4. Warehousing and the movement of goods would be more
controlled and efficient because the OTT Convention authorizes the
use of EDI.
Contra:
Some terminal operators believe that the existing regime and
insurance arrangements work.
F. Container Lessors
Pro:
1. Container lessors will benefit because the OTT Convention
provides that terminal operators may not sell containers owned by
leasing companies,1 98 except to satisfy claims by the terminals for the
cost of repairs to such containers. 199 Sale of leased containers to
satisfy charges against goods stored in leased containers currently
causes loss of leased containers. National laws on the rights of
198See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
199See supra note 148.
OTT Convention 391July 1994
392 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce
terminal owners to sell leased containers vary. The OTT Convention
would resolve this problem in the container lessors' favor.
2. The OTT Convention does not apply to container depots,
relationships with which are governed by commercial contract.
3. Container lessors will save money because they will not have to
replace containers lost to the foreign creditors of owners of goods.
4. Container lessors would experience less litigation under the
OTT Convention because terminal operators would not have the right
to sell leased containers to satisfy storage charges against the goods
stored in leased containers.
5. Certainty and predictability of the law on terminal operations
would facilitate the international container leasing business.
Contra:
The existing regime works and container lessors are able to insure
against uncertainties.
VII.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. delegation voted for the OTT Convention at the final vote
because it was convinced that, in the end, the difficult negotiations
had been successful and the goals set forth in its instructions had been
met. In particular, the U.S. delegation felt that the problem of U.S.
stevedores and the maritime bill of lading defenses had been satis-
factorily resolved.
The U.S. now should take the next step and ratify the OTT
Convention because of the benefits that will be reaped. Of course,
such ratification must occur with the understanding expressed by the
U.S. delegation at the end of the conference, namely, that Article 15
of the OTT Convention preserves the rights of U.S. stevedores and
terminal operators to the benefits available under COGSA.200
2
°°See supra text accompanying note 11.
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